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Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree:
An Analysis Of Agency And Judicial
Discretion
Peter M. Shanet
A core lesson of modern administrative law is that our govern-
ment of laws is profoundly a government of discretion. Many sig-
nificant federal administrative decisions are not subject to any
great procedural constraint as to their timing, origination, or for-
mat. To the extent administrative decisions are limited by congres-
sionally imposed substantive criteria, those criteria frequently
leave broad leeway for ultimate implementation. This state of af-
fairs does not mean that government administrators are typically
free to act merely on naked personal preference in the performance
of their tasks. It does mean, however, that the forces that constrain
discretion are often informal and largely beyond the capacity or
desire of courts to review.
One critical executive function where discretion infuses the ex-
ecution of the laws is the conduct of government litigation. Not
only government decisions to bring suit, but also the host of gov-
ernment decisions entailed in responding to a suit, typically are
left to the near-plenary discretion of the Attorney General and
subordinate lawyers. These decisions include whether and on what
terms to settle litigation-choices that obviously have a great po-
tential impact on the implementation of public policy through
litigation.
Courts and administrative law lawyers have recently expressed
substantial concern with one set of settlement decisions that
doubly involve the exercise of discretion.' These are discretionary
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa; A.B., Harvard, 1974; J.D., Yale, 1977. I would
like to thank Randy Bezanson, Arthur Bonfield, Geoffrey Miller, David Strauss, and Peter
Strauss for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, as well as Michael McConnell, both for
his informal comments and for his elegant and generous formal response. I am grateful also
for the research assistance of Joe Barron and Greg Schwager, Iowa '88.
National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 305 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dis-
cretion-limiting decrees present "extremely interesting ... novel, and far-reaching" issues);
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 1984) (not-
ing possible constitutional problems raised by broad interpretation of discretion-limiting
decrees).
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decisions to settle lawsuits through commitments that curtail the
future exercise of government discretion with respect to particular
subjects or particular parties. Such commitments may be embod-
ied in consent decrees or other settlement agreements. Judge
Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewing one such dis-
cretion-binding consent decree, has gone so far as to warn of the
"evil(s) of government by consent decree," including what he be-
lieves to be "its potential to freeze the regulatory processes of rep-
resentative democracy. "2 Last year, the Attorney General promul-
gated guidelines intended to prevent future resort to such decrees.3
Part I of this article describes discretion-limiting consent de-
crees. The remainder of the article addresses the legal and policy
problems that they pose. The first set of legal issues concerns the
substantive limits on the permissibility of the decrees. Such limits
pertain to both executive authority to enter agreements that bind
future exercises of executive discretion, and judicial authority to
approve such agreements. A second set of legal issues concerns the
impact of such decrees on third parties, and the adequacy of ex-
isting procedures to protect third-party rights. The policy issues
center on the appropriateness of executive acquiescence in a model
of public law that, as explained below, legitimates a potentially sig-
nificant degree of judicial supervision of administrative policy
making. An informed assessment of the legality and appropriate-
ness of discretion-limiting consent decrees must account for each
of these sets of issues.
2 Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
See text at notes 137-181. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Department
Policy Concerning Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986), reprinted
in Review of Nixon Presidential Material Access Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1986), reprinted in part in 54 U.S.L.W. 2492 (April 1,
1986) ("Attorney General's Guidelines") (on file with the University of Chicago Legal Fo-
rum). These guidelines are not as precise as this discussion tries to be in explaining which
consent decrees raise separation of powers or other legal questions. I try, however, to de-
scribe the problems posed in a way that is both most sensible and most consistent with the
Attorney General's apparent concerns. It is not the Department of Justice's position that all
consent decrees are unconstitutional: "The United States has never argued that it cannot
bind itself through agreements. Nor have we ever contended that the Attorney General...
does not have the authority to enter into binding settlement agreements, plea bargains, and
consent decrees." Reply Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. Board of Educ.
of the City of Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
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I. DISCRETION-LIMITING DECREES: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PROBLEM
Because consent decrees are judgments, and all judg-
ments-even in government litigation-are binding on the parties
to the immediate suit, it may not be immediately obvious why the
discretion-limiting features of some consent decrees have recently
attracted so much criticism. It is thus helpful to reflect on both the
nature of executive policy-making discretion in general, and on the
facts of several cases that illustrate the legal and policy concerns
that arise in connection with discretion-limiting decrees.
A. Revisable and Nonrevisable Discretion
The Constitution and a host of statutes vest in the executive a
wide range of decision-making powers that are deeply imbued with
discretion.4 That is, the timing, content and even the initiation of
many policies are left to the educated judgment of the designated
decision maker with the prospect, at most, of deferential judicial
review for rationality. That does not mean, however, that the legal
implications of all discretionary decisions are the same. They are
not. Some decisions, though not at all mandatory, may signifi-
cantly limit the decision maker's legal discretion to make future
decisions on the same subject matter, while other discretionary de-
cisions do not have this effect.
' For the most part, the analysis in this article of discretion that is constitutionally
vested in the President does not distinguish between discretion that the executive is pur-
posefully given and discretion that is the mere necessary artifact of executive obligation
under the Constitution. As an example of the former, the Constitution purposefully vests
plenary discretion in the President for the approval or disapproval of legislation because his
exercise of broad discretion is a Constitutional "good." It renders the intended system of
checks and balances more effective.
In contrast, it is possible to speak of executive discretion vested indirectly in connection
with its constitutional obligations, for example, its obligation not to inflict cruel and unusual
punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Because the executive's obligation is broadly de-
scribed, the President necessarily has discretion (within limits set by Congress) to determine
what, specifically, he will seek to impose in federal prisons as non-cruel, non-unusual pun-
ishment. The fact that the executive possesses such discretion is not so much part of the
Constitution's design, but a necessary evil; a constitution could not hope to describe specifi-
cally, for all times and all offenses, the limits of humane punishment. It is as if the Constitu-
tion instructed the President each day to sweep the White House kitchen; it would still
leave discretion to decide whether a broom or vacuum, a front-to-back or side-to-side sweep
would best fulfill this duty.
This distinction may be significant in assessing the legitimacy of either judicial or self-
imposed constraints on the President. Efforts to curtail executive discretion that is purpose-
fully vested may undermine the intended system of checks and balances. Constraints on
discretion that is merely incidental are less problematic if aimed at achieving a substan-
tively mandated constitutional goal.
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Presidential pardons5 are perfect examples of discretionary de-
cisions that limit the decision maker's future discretion. No one is
entitled to a presidential pardon; whether to pardon a person and
why are left entirely to the President's discretion. 6 Yet, once a
President executes a pardon, there is no prosecuting the pardoned
person for the relevant offense. Even though the President and his
successors have a constitutional obligation to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, and even though the President or his
successors may come to regret the pardon as unjustified, there is
no further prospect of prosecution.' Legally, the initial exercise of
discretion is nonrevisable.
In contrast, many acts of discretion by executive officials have
only a limited, if any, legal impact on the future discretion of the
decision maker. For example, if the President exercises discretion
today to urge Congress to fund his Strategic Defense Initiative, he
is free tomorrow to repudiate his views and urge unilateral dis-
armament. He may appear inconsistent, but his inconsistency is
plainly lawful. Likewise, the President may nominate today a par-
ticular individual for a federal judgeship and, tomorrow, refuse to
appoint that person to his or her post. He may do so even if the
Senate has consented to the appointment. Until he signs the judge-
designate's commission, the President's act of discretion is revis-
able by him.'
The easiest way of characterizing the concern that apparently
animates the criticisms of Judge Wilkey and others is that some
government consent decrees have the effect of rendering decisions
that, outside the context of litigation, would ordinarily be exercises
of substantially revisable discretion, into discretionary decisions
that are substantially less revisable or, indeed, wholly nonrevisable.
Not all settlement agreements or consent decrees have this im-
pact. For example, the United States might, in a tort suit, agree to
settle a plaintiff's claim for a particular sum. It need not agree to
settle; the decision is discretionary. Once the settlement is made,
however, it is enforceable against the United States. Therefore, the
promise to settle is a relatively nonrevisable discretionary promise.
5 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, par. 1.
I Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119-121 (1925);'Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221,
1225 (D.D.C. 1974).
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
' Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803).
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Promises by the United States to pay money in return for con-
sideration, however, are typically nonrevisable promises, whether
made in consent decrees or otherwise. Any government contract is
binding within the framework Congress has provided for the en-
forcement of contracts, even if the contracting decision is itself ini-
tially discretionary. Therefore, the fact that a promise to pay dam-
ages arises in the specific contractual context of settling a lawsuit
does not affect the ordinary status of the contracting decision as
one that is nonrevisable. The legal impact of a contracting decision
on future government decisions with respect to the other con-
tracting party is the same, whether or not the decision is made in
the shadow of litigation.
Consider, in contrast, an agency promise to investigate a par-
ticular subject matter area as the possible target for rule making or
other law enforcement. An agency might be tempted to proffer
such a promise in a lawsuit challenging the agency's failure to en-
force a particular regulatory statute. Such a promise, if made un-
conditionally, would seemingly become enforceable if embodied in
a consent judgment. It would be a relatively nonrevisable promise,
much like the promise to pay damages.
Outside the context of litigation, however, such a promise
would be completely revisable. The Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") might today address a conven-
tion of environmental protection groups and promise to investigate
a particular industry that is suspected of polluting the air or water
in violation of a federal antipollution statute. Should the Adminis-
trator later decide to devote enforcement resources to a wholly dif-
ferent industry under the same statute, however, there would be no
legal sanction for that change of mind.10 The promise would carry
none of the future-binding impact that it does in the context of a
consent decree.
In general, it is such settlements-settlements that turn rela-
tively revisable discretionary decisions outside the litigation con-
text into significantly less revisable discretionary decisions under
consent judgments-that are at the core of recent criticism. It
should be emphasized, however, that a superficial comparative
view of agency discretion-revisable outside the litigation context,
nonrevisable under a consent decree-may not fully appreciate a
defendant agency's position in litigation. The agency's act of dis-
cretion in settling a lawsuit occurs in the shadow of litigation that
10 See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 249-50 (1967); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 830-32 (1985).
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might establish agency liability for implementing a remedy. Should
the agency lose the lawsuit, it might be required to submit a reme-
dial plan for the trial court's approval or otherwise demonstrate to
the court its compliance with its legal obligations.1 Once embodied
in a judgment, such an order, like a consent decree, would permit
subsequent judicial supervision of agency policy making. Thus, the
constraint on discretion embodied in a consent decree may be
greater than the agency would enjoy absent litigation, but not dif-
ferent in kind from the constraint that would exist if the agency
went to trial and lost.
B. Illustrative Cases
A brief summary of several recent cases helps make concrete
the problem just identified with respect to discretion-limiting con-
sent decrees.
1. Managerial Discretion: Citizens for a Better Environment
v. Gorsuch.'2 Between 1973 and 1975, five environmental groups
sued the EPA for failure to enforce properly the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), now called the Clean Water
Act."3 Two cases charged EPA with failing to meet certain statu-
tory deadlines for promulgating final effluent standards for toxic
substances EPA had already listed as requiring statutory control.1 4
A third case charged EPA with using improper criteria for deciding
which toxic pollutants were to be subjected to control and thus
failing to include certain named toxic substances within its regula-
tory program.' 5 The final case charged EPA with failing to promul-
1 See, for example, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979) (requiring USDA officials who failed to
enforce the affirmative action obligations of federal contractors with the agency to submit to
the district court copies of future affirmative action plans approved by the agency, in order
to permit the court to insure compliance with the agency's legal obligations).
2 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For further discussion of this case and of the role of
consent decrees in environmental litigation generally, see Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of
Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U.
Chi. Legal F. 327, 338-40. Although Professor Percival examines the phenomenon of discre-
tion-limiting consent decrees through a particular subject-matter perspective, readers of his
essay will readily detect that his general perspective on the legality and appropriateness of
such decrees is essentially the same as my own.
-3 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
"4 Environmental Defense Fund v. Train, Civil Action No. 75-0172 (D.D.C. 1976); Citi-
zens for a Better Environment v. Train, Civil Action No. 75-1698 (D.D.C. 1976). The cases
are reported at 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120.
15 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, Civil Action No. 73-2153 (D.D.C. 1976),
reported at 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120.
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gate certain pretreatment standards for toxics. 16
EPA subsequently entered settlement negotiations with the
plaintiffs and with four industry intervenors in the toxic criteria
case. Over the objections of three intervenors, EPA and the plain-
tiffs agreed to a settlement amounting to "a detailed, comprehen-
sive regulatory program for implementation by EPA of the toxic
pollutant control and pretreatment objectives" of the FWPCA.'7
The EPA decree did not dictate the substantive terms of any regu-
lation. It did specify, however, the general strategy EPA would em-
ploy in regulating toxics. The decree also targeted particular indus-
tries and specific pollutants for investigation for possible
regulation, and specified deadlines by which regulations would be
issued and compliance demanded.1 8
In 1977, the dissenting industry intervenors moved to vacate
the consent decree on various grounds, including its alleged super-
session by the Clean Air Act of 1977. The district court, with EPA's
support, upheld the decree."9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the district court, but re-
manded on an issue not fully argued below-whether judicial ap-
proval of the original decree was improper because the decree im-
permissibly curtailed EPA's regulatory discretion. 0 On remand,
EPA joined the intervenors in seeking to remove from the decree
any discretion-limiting provisions."
The district court on remand rejected tue intervenors' argu-
ments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.22 In essence, both courts
regarded EPA's commitments with respect to the management of
its regulatory program to have been statutorily authorized as a
means both for implementing the underlying law and for compro-
mising the litigation against EPA.23 Over the vigorous dissent of
Judge Wilkey,24 the Court of Appeals panel rejected the argument
11 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Agee, Civil Action No. 75-1267 (D.D.C. 1976),
reported at 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120.
" Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1834
(D.D.C. 1979).
8 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
" Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833
(D.D.C. 1976).
20 Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d at 1259.
21 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084
(D.D.C. 1982).
22 Id., aff'd as Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
22 Natural Resources Defense Council, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2087; Citizens for a
Better Environment, 718 F.2d at 1125-28.
24 Citizens for a Better Environment, 718 F.2d at 1130 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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that courts could approve only those details of a consent decree
that represented legitimate remedies for particular violations of
the underlying statute.2 5 Such a holding, the panel argued, would
itself be an unauthorized constraint on the agency's discretion in
the conduct of litigation.2"
In this case, it is clear that EPA's settlement converted acts of
ordinarily revisable discretion into acts of significantly less revis-
able discretion. The clearest example is EPA's agreement to target
twenty-one major industries for investigation. Some of the speci-
fied industries were targeted by the FWPCA for investigation;27
others were not. Ordinarily, the choice of targets for prosecutorial
investigation beyond those specified by statute is entirely within
the agency's discretion.2 By contrast, under the consent decree,
EPA could change its investigative strategy only with the court's
concurrence in the justifiability of a modification of the decree.
The very requirement that it proffer a reason for its proposed
changes diminished the revisability of the targeting decision
significantly.
2. Budgeting Discretion: United States v. Board of Educa-
tion of the City of Chicago.2 9 In 1980, the Justice Department de-
cided to initiate a desegregation suit against the Chicago Board of
Education unless negotiations could produce a voluntary school
desegregation plan. On September 24, 1980, a federal district court
approved a consent decree3 ° providing for the voluntary desegrega-
tion of the country's third-largest school system.31 The decree was
unusual because it imposed obligations not only on the defendant
28 Id. at 1125.
26 Id. at 1127.
27 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (1982).
28 See cases cited in note 10.
29 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving consent decree); 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D.
Ill. 1983), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding U.S. in viola-
tion of consent decree); 567 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of
Board of Education's desegregation plan); 588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1984), vacated and
remanded, 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984) (accepting U.S. plan for compliance with consent
decree and remanding for determination whether defendant receiving full entitlement of
currently available funds); 610 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (denying government's motion
for release of sequestered funds); 621 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (setting further guide-
lines for creating a funding arrangement under the consent decree); vacated and remanded,
799 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the litigation, see Neal
Devins and James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago
School Desegregation Cases, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1243 (1984).
20 United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 554 F. Supp. 912, 913 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
31 The Associated Press, US Endorses Chicago's Proposal for Voluntary School Inte-
gration, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1982, p. 1, col. 2.
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school board, but also on the United States. Specifically, the de-
cree provided: "Each party is obligated to make every good faith
effort to find and provide every available form of financial re-
sources adequate for the implementation of the desegregation
plan. 32
When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, part of
its agenda was the dismantling of the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion, 33 a reduction in the growth rate of federal spending for educa-
tion, and a reduction in categorical federal education aid, that is,
aid specifically targeted for particular purposes such as desegrega-
tion. 34 The Administration's legislative activities on behalf of these
goals had the effect of reducing the prospect for appropriations
that might result in federal funding for Chicago.
35
The Board of Education sought to have the United States held
in contempt for failing to meet its obligations under the consent
decree. It argued that the obligation to "find and provide every
available form of financial resources" contemplated a duty actually
to assist the desegregation effort with funds that were or might
become available to the Department of Education for that purpose,
and not to discourage such funding. The Justice Department re-
sponded that the consent decree did not embody any affirmative
funding obligation, but only the obligation to assist Chicago in lo-
cating and applying for funds that had been earmarked by Con-
gress for school desegregation.3
The district court agreed with the Board of Education's posi-
tion. Without specifically defining the decree's obligatory language,
the court concluded that the Administration's efforts to reduce the
amount of funding that might be available to Chicago was a bad
faith departure from the decree.37 Conceding that it was going be-
yond the terms of the decree, the court ordered the executive to
seek to make sufficient funding available to Chicago to finance the
desegregation effort in 1983-84.11 This obligation included a re-
quirement to seek further funding from Congress, as needed. 9
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's determina-
S2 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 139.
Transcript from Presidential News Conference, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, p. 10, col.
4; Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 567 F. Supp. at 275.
31 Devins and Stedman, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1254-57 (cited in note 29).
35 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 567 F. Supp. at 275-80.
31 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 717 F.2d at 381.
17 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 567 F. Supp. at 280.
38 Id. at 282-83.
39 Id.
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tion that the United States obligated itself to do more than help
Chicago to locate funding programs and to file applications.4"
Nonetheless, it vacated the lower court's order. The Court of Ap-
peals was concerned that a finding of Administration bad faith
based on its legislative recommendations might raise "a significant
constitutional issue."" Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined
it a sufficient ground to sustain some affirmative relief that the
lower court found that the Secretary of Education currently had
available to him discretionary funds that he had failed to make
available to Chicago.42
On remand, the district court required the United States to
make a good faith effort to provide financial resources adequate for
implementation of the school board's desegregation plan. 3 The
United States continued to resist any affirmative obligation of
funds to Chicago, however, and submitted an alternative plan for
compliance with its obligations. This plan promised priority to
Chicago in the distribution of funding under existing federal pro-
grams.44 The district court determined that the United States was
still in violation of the consent decree, and again ordered it to pay
the full shortfall sustained by Chicago in funding its desegregation
effort in 1984-85.15 The Court of Appeals vacated the order, con-
cluding that granting priority funding to Chicago would comply
with the consent decree. It remanded, however, for a further evi-
dentiary determination "whether the Board is receiving the maxi-
mum level of funding that is available under the criteria of pro-
grams through which funds for desegregation can be disbursed."4 6
The United States' promise in the consent decree to "find and
provide every available form of financial resources" for Chicago de-
segregation rendered less revisable what otherwise would have
been completely revisable executive discretion. The impact would
have been greatest, of course, had the Court of Appeals agreed that
the consent decree operated as a limitation on the executive's fu-
ture discretion to recommend budgetary measures to Congress.
Outside the context of litigation, an executive branch promise to
support funding for one cause today imposes no legal limit whatso-
ever on its discretion to oppose that same funding tomorrow.
40 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 717 F.2d at 381-82.
41 Id. at 383.
42 Id.
43 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 246.
1 Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 744 F.2d at 1305.
41 588 F. Supp. at 246.
4' 744 F.2d at 1306.
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Even if the decree is read more narrowly-only as a promise to
grant Chicago some form of funding priority within existing pro-
grams-that kind of budgetary decision, outside the litigation con-
text, would likewise be revisable unless constrained by statute.47
The decision to constrain discretion in this way is all the more no-
table because the United States was the plaintiff and not the de-
fendant in this suit. The United States did not limit its discretion
over budgeting in order to avoid the judicial imposition of liability
for funding Chicago school desegregation; instead, the United
States committed itself to assisting Chicago in order to facilitate
Chicago's compliance with its legal obligations to minority stu-
dents and to the United States.
3. Rule-Making Discretion: Ferrell v. Pierce.48 In early 1986,
Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper cited a dispute over
the administration of a federal mortgage relief program as a case
that lent impetus to the Attorney General's Guidelines curbing dis-
cretion-limiting decrees. 49 The decree at issue in that case, Ferrell
v. Pierce,5 ° was actually not discretion-limiting in the sense ad-
dressed by the Attorney General's Guidelines, however. The court
denied a motion by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment ("HUD") to modify the decree, not because the decree
limited discretion HUD otherwise enjoyed in the design of its pro-
gram, but because HUD lacked authority under the governing stat-
ute to administer its program as the modification contemplated.
Nonetheless, a review of Ferrell suggests how a consent decree
might have an impact on the substantive bounds of permissible
agency rule making.
In 1973, various plaintiffs filed a class action against HUD
charging HUD with failing, in violation of the National Housing
Act 51 and other statutes, to provide mortgage foreclosure relief to
holders of various HUD-insured mortgages. They claimed that
HUD's failure to provide such relief led to premature foreclosures
7 See Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 55 Comp. Gen. 813, 819-21
(1976) (agencies authorized to reprogram funds under lump sum appropriations); Memoran-
dum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General from Larry L. Simms, Deputy Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, re: Use of Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion Program Grant Funds for Administrative Purposes, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 674, 675
(June 5, 1980) (same).
48 743 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984).
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference with Charles J. Cooper,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 3 (Mar. 21, 1986) (copy on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum).
0 743 F.2d 454.
51 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
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against low-income mortgagors who, with some assistance, could
have met their mortgage obligations.
HUD agreed in 1976 to a consent decree under which it prom-
ised to establish a mortgage relief program. Specifically, HUD
agreed to criteria under which it would accept an assignment from
a mortgagee of the HUD-insured obligation upon which the mort-
gagor had defaulted. In addition, HUD promised (a) to adopt time
limits for processing mortgagors' applications for mortgage assign-
ments, (b) to require mortgagees not to foreclose pending HUD ac-
tion on the mortgagors' applications, and (c) to work out repay-
ment plans (called "forebearance agreements") with qualifying
mortgagors after the assignment of their obligations to HUD.2
In 1979, the plaintiffs complained to the court that HUD was
routinely erring in the processing of assignment applications.53
HUD and the plaintiffs subsequently agreed to a revised settle-
ment under which HUD would operate the assignment program for
five years under a newly revised HUD handbook. During that five
years, the handbook could be revised, but only after notice to
plaintiffs' counsel and only if the "basic rights" of participating
mortgagors remained protected. At the end of five years, HUD
would be free to decide to continue the assignment program or to
adopt an "equivalent substitute."54
In 1979, an assignment program was the only form of mort-
gage relief that HUD possessed statutory authority to adopt.5 5 In
1980, however, Congress amended the National Housing Act to
permit a Temporary Mortgage Assistance Program ("TMAP") that
52 Ferrell, 743 F.2d at 457.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 457-58.
55 If HUD had possessed discretion in 1979 to choose any of a variety of forms of mort-
gage relief, then a decision by HUD outside the context of litigation to adopt the assignment
program would presumably have reflected an exercise of largely revisable discretion. That is,
if HUD, at any later time, determined that a nonarbitrary, noncapricious rationale sup-
ported the institution of a form of foreclosure relief different from the assignment program,
it could have withdrawn the assignment program and implemented a substitute. Under this
scenario, HUD's agreement in 1979 to maintain an assignment program for five years would
have converted the adoption of that program from an act of revisable discretion into an act
of significantly less revisable discretion. Once HUD's promise was embodied in a consent
decree, it could implement a substitute for the assignment program within five years only if
it could persuade the court to agree to a modification of the consent decree. The existence of
a merely rational basis for preferring the substitute as a matter of policy might not be suffi-
cient to justify the modification. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)
(only "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" should
prompt court to modify consent decree).
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would not involve an assignment of the mortgage to HUD.56 This
strategy was intended to be less expensive for HUD, which would
not be required to pay the mortgagee for the assignment of the
entire obligation.57 HUD promptly drafted TMAP implementing
regulations and sought modification of the 1979 revised settlement
to reflect the change in the law.5 8
Yet, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of HUD's motion
to abandon the assignment program in favor of a TMAP. HUD's
proffered alternative program was, in several respects, less advan-
tageous for participating mortgagors than the 1979 assignment
program, and thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, was in viola-
tion of the legislative intent behind Congress's 1980 enactment.5 9
Consequently, the particular TMAP that HUD proposed in 1980
would have been beyond HUD's discretion under the 1980 statute,
whether adopted in the context of litigation or otherwise.
Ferrell suggests the capacity of consent decrees to render stat-
utory discretion over rule making less revisable when such discre-
tion would exist outside of litigation. It is unclear from the Sev-
enth Circuit's dicta whether that court would have regarded HUD
as entitled to a modification of its consent decree obligations if,
outside the context of litigation, the TMAP it proposed would
have been authorized under the 1980 Act. If the court had consid-
ered the proposed alternative as authorized, but still denied the
requested modification, then the 1979 settlement would have ren-
dered HUD's substantive rule-making discretion significantly less
revisable than it would have been without the decree.
These three cases illustrate the capacity of consent decrees to
render less revisable executive discretion regarding the manage-
ment of law enforcement, budgeting, and administrative rule mak-
ing. They illustrate the capacity of consent decrees to have this
impact whether the United States is plaintiff or defendant, and
whether the executive discretion involved is statutorily or constitu-
tionally based. The remainder of this article discusses the legality
and appropriateness of such decrees.
11 Ferrell, 743 F.2d at 458.
57 Id.
'8 Id. at 460.
" Id. at 463, 465.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON DISCRETION-LIMITING
CONSENT DECREES
The threshold problem raised by discretion-limiting consent
decrees is, of course, the degree to which they are substantively
lawful. Because consent decrees are, by their nature, part contract,
part judicial act,60 two types of limits arise as to their substantive
legality. First, because the decree embodies a contract, it depends
on a lawful agreement between the parties." One question that
thus arises with respect to discretion-limiting decrees is whether
the executive has authority to limit its discretion through a settle-
ment agreement. Second, because a decree is part judicial act, it is
constrained also by the legal limits on judicial authority. A second
question that arises about discretion-limiting decrees, therefore, is
whether a court has power to approve them.
A. Executive Authority to Bind Executive Discretion
It is patent that not all executive promises to render adminis-
trative discretion less revisable would be legally permissible. Any
such promise made in the settlement of litigation is itself an act of
discretion, and must rest on some underlying authority, either
statutory or constitutional. For example, neither the Constitution
nor any statute authorizes any corrupt promise to limit discretion.
Thus, a promise to limit discretion that is not induced by the At-
torney General's appraisal of the best interests of the United
States, but by a bribe or other inappropriate appeal to self-inter-
est, is an impermissible basis for settlement.
It seems likely, moreover, that the constitutional bar to "high
crimes and misdemeanors"62 is not the only limit on permissible
promises to bind discretion. Congress has confined the Attorney
General's statutory authority to conduct litigation to the broadest
of standards: that the Attorney General "attend to the interests of
the United States."6 On the basis of this mandate, Attorneys Gen-
eral have repeatedly referred to their settlement authority as "ple-
nary.'' 64 Yet, even the "plenary" authorities of the United States
60 See, for example, United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37
(1975).
61 See Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3077-78 (1986).
62 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
63 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1982).
64 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 98, 102 (1934); Attorney General's Guidelines 181 (cited in note 3).
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are presumptively subject to the limiting principles of the
Constitution. 5
In order to ascertain the precise contours of executive author-
ity to limit the revisability of executive discretion, it is helpful to
distinguish discretion that is vested in the executive by the Consti-
tution from discretion that is vested by statute. This distinction is
helpful because the source of the executive discretion at issue cor-
responds to the source of any legal constraint that operates on ex-
ecutive authority to limit that discretion. Any constraints on exec-
utive authority to limit discretion that has been vested in the
President by the Constitution will themselves be based in the Con-
stitution. As far as I know, Congress has passed no statute address-
ing the President's power to compromise his own constitutionally
based discretion.
On the other hand, constraints on executive authority to limit
discretion that has been vested in the executive by statute are
themselves essentially statutory and must be determined with ref-
erence to legislative intent. The discretion subject to limitation is
discretion delegated by Congress, at its discretion. Whether the
President may compromise discretion Congress has so vested is
likewise a matter within Congress's power to decide. 6
1. Executive Authority to Limit Constitutionally Vested Ex-
ecutive Discretion. Much of the discretion vested in the President
directly by the Constitution is critical to the successful operation
of the government as the Constitution envisions it. For example,
the President's authority to disapprove legislation under Article I,
Section 7, is obviously of central importance to the system of
checks and balances in the legislative process erected by the Con-
stitution.6 7 Thus, any purported promise, say, not to veto any envi-
ronmental protection bill voted by Congress during the next five
years could not have legal force. It would represent an abdication
Il Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134-35 (1976) (Congress's power to provide "necessary
and proper" means for the selection of Federal Election Commissioners is subject to the
limitations of the Article II Appointments Clause); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957)
(national power to enter into international agreements limited by provisions of the Consti-
tution protecting individual rights); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968) (state's
facially unlimited constitutional power to determine the manner of selecting its presidential
electors, U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, par. 2, is limited by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
6 Of course, there is a sense, if Congress has limited the President's power to compro-
mise his statutory discretion, that there is also a constitutional limit on his discretion-limit-
ing power: he is constitutionally bound to respect the limits that Congress has enacted. This
does not add anything, however, to the search for limits on the executive power to compro-
mise statutorily vested discretion. Those limits must be divined by reference to statutes, not
to the constitutional command that he obey them.
617 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, pars. 2-3.
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of a nondelegable constitutional function,68 and thus a void
promise.
Similarly, the President's authority to pardon offenses against
the United States 9 is an express check on the judiciary. A pur-
ported promise, say, not to pardon any person convicted of a crimi-
nal civil rights offense during the next five years would likewise be
void.
These examples suggest that any executive promise to render
constitutionally based discretion less revisable under a consent de-
cree should be void and unenforceable. Such a doctrine would pro-
vide a bright line substantive limitation on discretion-binding con-
sent decrees, and the executive has, in fact, advanced this position
in litigation. °
A familiar counterexample, however, suggests that such a doc-
trine would be too restrictive of the President's authority to render
his discretion less revisable. The example is the practice of promis-
ing nonprosecution on particular criminal charges to individuals
who agree (a) to plead guilty to lesser charges, or (b) to cooperate
with the prosecution of others. 1 Such promises are enforceable7
2
although they preclude the future exercise of ordinary
prosecutorial discretion to charge persons with criminal offenses.
The executive branch is authorized to limit its constitutionally
based prosecutorial discretion 3 in this way because the exercise of
current executive discretion to confine future executive discretion
over prosecution can be justified in particular cases by a suffi-
ciently weighty public interest in law enforcement. 4 Such an im-
68 See The Federalist Papers No. 74 (Hamilton) (New American Library ed. 1961)
(suggesting nondelegability of pardon power); James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy:
The Administrative Process and American Government 89-90 (1978) (same).
69 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, par. 1.
70 Reply Brief for the United States at 14, Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 744
F.2d at 1300 (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
71 U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual 9-27.610 (1984).
72 United States v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 1977)
(upholding dismissal of indictment against corporation and corporate officials who provided
information to United States under informal nonprosecution agreement).
7' See, for example, Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1868); Smith v. United States, 375
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967).
74 At the University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium held on November 15, 1986,
some commentators suggested that executive discretion to enter informal, binding non-
prosecution agreements could be explained under two alternative rationales that would not
have any broad implications for executive authority to restrain constitutionally vested exec-
utive discretion.
Professor Michael McConnell suggested that the power followed logically from the exec-
utive's power, once a prosecution is initiated, to dismiss a criminal case voluntarily with
prejudice. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Have Elections? Using Consent Decrees to In-
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plicit balancing judgment is consistent with the Supreme Court's
balancing approach generally to separation of powers questions not
addressed explicitly by the constitutional text. The Court has said:
[I]n determining whether [an act of one branch] disrupts
the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the
proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents
[one branch] from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions. Only where the potential for disruption
sulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 303, 309. His argument
seems to be that, because the executive, through an alternative device, could unilaterally
accomplish the same result as a binding nonprosecution agreement entered into without the
initiation of any prosecution, the nonprosecution agreement must be valid. If that is so,
however, then the President's power to constrain his own discretion is far broader than I
had imagined. He could constrain his discretion categorically in any situation in which he
could subsequently exercise that discretion on a case-by-case basis to achieve the same re-
sult. The President may, for example, veto every environmental bill that Congress passes
during his term or pardon every convicted offender of federal law who is a Republican. It
follows from Professor McConnell's argument that the President could make a binding
promise in advance to veto all environmental bills or pardon all Republican criminals-a
position I reject.
Assistant Attorney General Cooper suggested, if I understood him correctly, that courts
enforce informal nonprosecution agreements to keep their own hands clean. It is not that
courts recognize executive authority to confine executive discretion, but rather that courts
will not be party to breaches of executive promises regarding the exercise of judicial power.
Although Mr. Cooper did not specify the impetus for the judicial stance he asserts, it would
not follow logically either as a judicial policy to preserve the integrity of the courts or as a
means of enforcing any due process protection owed to defendants. (Professor McConnell's
assertion of "due process" and "finality" reasons supporting nonprosecution agreements, id.
at 310-11 are inapposite to informal agreements, that is, agreements that are entered into
without the initiation of any prosecution against the protected potential defendant.)
First, judicial integrity would not be implicated in entertaining prosecutions initiated in
violation of informal executive nonprosecution agreements because courts are not parties to
those agreements. It is doubtful, furthermore, that courts possess supervisory power over
the executive branch except to control judicial procedure and to remedy violations of federal
law. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1433 (1984).
Second, due process is only weakly implicated in such agreements because they do not
involve government representations as to the government's behavior vis-a-vis future private
conduct.
Finally, courts do permit the executive in some cases to invoke judicial authority in a
manner that is inconsistent with executive promises. For example, although some discern a
contemporary trend to the contrary, numerous cases hold that administrative agencies are
not bound by unauthorized promises by their employees. Thus, the Supreme Court refused
to permit as a defense, in a government suit to enjoin the use of public forest land for the
construction of an electric power plant, that certain government officers had represented
that such a use would be allowed. The Court reasoned that the government could not be
estopped by a legally unauthorized promise. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U.S. 389 (1917). See also Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (Social Security Admin-
istration held not liable for insurance benefits for which plaintiff would have applied but for
agency official's failure to inform her, as required by agency handbook, of need to apply).
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is present must we then determine whether that impact
is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority [of the acting
branch].
Presumably, the limits on any branch's authority to interfere with
its own assigned tasks should be assessed under a functional test
similar to this test for interbranch disputes. Under this reasoning,
an executive promise to render its discretion less revisable would
not be unconstitutional if (a) such a promise did not prevent the
executive from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions, or (b) if such a promise were justified by an overriding need
to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of the
executive.
Whether a consent decree promise binding future executive
discretion prevents the executive branch from accomplishing its
constitutional functions is likely to turn on two factors. The first is
the degree to which the ordinary revisability of executive discre-
tion on the question involved is essential to the constitutional
checks and balances. For example, the insertion of the President
into the legislative process via the veto mechanism was so critical
an aspect of the framers' design that any enforceable promise to
veto or not to veto particular legislation arguably should be re-
garded as a per se disruption of the executive's responsibilities.
The second factor is the degree of freedom the executive has,
through a modification of a consent decree, to renege on a discre-
tion-binding promise it has made in that decree. For example, if
the executive were entitled to a modification of a promise concern-
ing the future exercise of constitutionally based discretion when-
ever it could articulate to a court a substantial reason for regarding
the modification as necessary to the exercise of a constitutional ob-
ligation, then the promise itself would not significantly disrupt the
executive's assigned duties.
So permissive a standard for decree modification would be a
departure from current law. The ordinary precondition for ob-
taining a modification over the objections of the other party to a
consent decree is that the party seeking the modification demon-
strate a change of circumstances rendering enforcement of the
original decree a serious injustice.76 Under this standard, the exec-
utive would likely argue that any promise rendering constitution-
75 Nixon v. Administrator of Government Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
71 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
[1987:
POLICY MAKING BY CONSENT DECREE
ally based discretion less revisable disrupts the executive's dis-
charge of its constitutional functions, and should be presumed a
"serious injustice" on its face. Even if a court were to accept that
presumption as its starting point, however, its determination of
whether a "serious injustice" is actually presented is likely to turn
on the second prong of the Supreme Court's separation of powers
inquiry-the weightiness of the public interest proffered to justify
the executive's original discretion-limiting promise.
In United States v. Board of Education of the City of Chi-
cago, 7  the executive made a discretion-binding promise that re-
quired justification on this basis. As recounted above,' 8 the United
States, after suing the Chicago Board of Education to require the
desegregation of Chicago schools, made a "best efforts" promise to
assist in desegregation funding, as part of the consent decree set-
tling that suit. The Board of Education argued, and a district court
held, that the "best efforts" promise constituted a pledge that the
President would not exercise his authority "to recommend [to Con-
gress] such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient"7 9
in a way that would impede federal funding of Chicago's school
desegregation effort.8 0 Although the Court of Appeals ruled that
the consent decree in fact made no commitment with respect to
the President's powers of legislative recommendation,81 it is worth-
while to consider whether it would have been constitutional for the
Attorney General to promise expressly, "[t]he executive shall not
sponsor legislation rendering the implementation of the decree
impracticable."82
Assuming that such a promise would inhibit the executive in
the performance of constitutionally assigned functions,8 3 a strong
7 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See note 29 for the entire case history.
78 See text at notes 29-47.
79 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
80 United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 567 F. Supp. 272, 286-87 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
81 United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1984).
82 Professor McConnell mischaracterizes this hypothetical in his rebuttal. McConnell,
1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 311-12, 318-20 (cited in note 74).
" This assumption may well be wrong, which would, of course, make my hypothetical
wholly unproblematic. Consider, for example, a lawsuit in which, through a consent order or
ordinary judgment, the executive is required to pay a certain sum in damages to a particular
plaintiff. Presidential sponsorship of legislation forbidding the executive to pay out federal
funds in satisfaction of such an obligation would presumably be an unlawful interference
with the plaintiff's vested legal rights. This would be true even though a court could not
enjoin the President from sponsoring such a bill. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
(executive withholding of Justice of the Peace's commission held violative of his vested legal
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case can be made that overriding interests justify the promise. The
promise could be viewed as furthering the executive's obligation to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed by helping to insure
the effective vindication of the rights of Chicago school children to
nondiscriminatory treatment under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.8' It could also be viewed as furthering the Attorney Gen-
eral's statutory obligation to attend to the interests of the United
States by avoiding the extraordinary effort and expense of a trial.
Indeed, the avoidance of trial would likely be a significant contri-
bution itself to the vindication of the schoolchildren's rights, be-
cause effective desegregation is far more likely when undertaken
with the initiative and cooperation of responsible school authori-
ties. 5 Whether such an argument would persuade a court of the
enforceability of the hypothetical promise is uncertain; but the ar-
gument is persuasive, partly because of the public interests in-
volved and partly because the interference with executive responsi-
bilities is limited.
It is in any event fairly easy to avoid constitutional problems
with consent decrees that limit the future exercise of constitution-
ally based executive discretion. Any consent decree that makes a
promise constraining the future exercise of constitutionally based
discretion entered in settlement of a suit in which the United
States is a defendant, could provide: "The sole remedy for the de-
rights although no court possessed jurisdiction to grant a remedy); State of Mississippi v.
Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) (courts may not issue injunctions directing the President in the
exercise of discretionary authority). An express presidential promise not to sponsor such
legislation would seem permissible because it would amount, in essence, only to a promise to
act lawfully.
It is possible to view the President's role vis-a-vis modern administrative lawsuits simi-
larly. Judgments in such lawsuits also create rights in plaintiffs. It is thus arguable that the
President would be acting just as unlawfully in seeking legislative sabotage of such a judg-
ment as he would if he sought to impede an ordinary "individual-regarding" judgment in a
traditional suit. Consequently, an express promise not to sponsor sabotage legislation would
be equally permissible.
My chief reservation with this analysis is that the rights guaranteed in "policy-regard-
ing" consent decrees are often "rights" that are not possessed in any distinct way by the
plaintiffs, but rather executive commitments to perform obligations owed to the public gen-
erally. When the executive perceives, subsequent to the entry of a consent decree, that the
public interest would be better served by a redefinition of its obligations, it is not so obvi-
ously irresponsible for the executive to seek to persuade Congress of that view, and it per-
haps should not be viewed as contrary to the rule of law. An executive promise never to do
so might thus be more problematic than a promise never to seek legislation that would
impede an individual-regarding decree.
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
"' Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of
Schools, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1041, 1110-11 (1984).
[1987:
POLICY MAKING BY CONSENT DECREE
partment's or agency's failure to comply with [the relevant terms
of the settlement agreement] shall be the revival of the suit." Any
such consent decree entered in settlement of a suit in which the
United States is the plaintiff could provide a similar limitation on
enforcement, such as: "The United States shall not be deemed in
violation of this decree because of the exercise of policy-making
discretion vested in the executive by the Constitution, including
discretion to sponsor, oppose, or refrain from sponsoring or oppos-
ing any federal legislation or appropriation." Were a consent de-
cree to contain this language, there could be no enforcement of the
executive's promise in a manner disruptive of the President's con-
stitutional functions even if the executive could not persuade a
court to approve a modification of its obligations. 6
2. Executive Authority to Limit Discretion Vested by Stat-
ute. The discretion-binding promises that appear in consent de-
crees are more likely to involve the exercise of statutory, rather
than constitutional, discretion. That is because lawsuits concerning
the discretionary decision making of the United States typically
involve areas where the executive's entire decision-making author-
ity comes from Congress, that is, cases of domestic peacetime so-
cial and economic regulation. As explained above,87 the scope of
executive power to render executive statutory discretion less revis-
able than it would otherwise be must be determined with primary
reference to statutory law, not the Constitution.
There are several ways in which a consent decree designed to
enforce an agency's statutory obligation to regulate in a particular
area might appear to render less revisable certain statutory discre-
tion vested in the agency. The most obvious example would be an
agreement to promulgate a regulation as required by statute.
Outside the litigation context, the Administrative Procedure Act88
ordinarily permits an agency that has promulgated a rule to re-
scind or amend the rule so long as it can proffer a reasoned basis
for doing so.8" Unless a consent decree promising to issue a rule
expressly reserved that amendatory discretion, however, the
agency's authority to amend any rule promulgated pursuant to the
decree might depend on its ability to secure a modification of the
decree. A motion for modification is an appeal to the discretion of
8 For an argument why courts should lower the standard for granting modifications of
consent decrees to protect executive branch discretion, see text at note 105.
' See text at note 66.
88 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
" Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
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the court and, as noted above, the moving party is ordinarily enti-
tled to a modification only when the consent decree no longer con-
forms to the applicable law or when continued implementation of
the unamended decree would amount to a "grievous wrong."90 It is
not at all clear that the existence of a reasoned basis sufficient to
justify an amended rule outside the litigation context would entitle
the agency as a matter of law to a modification of the decree to
permit that same amendment.
That being so, an agency willing to proffer a new rule in settle-
ment of a lawsuit must consider what it wants to do about its
amendatory power. One strategy would simply be to insist that the
agency's discretion under the consent decree be no less revisable
than its ordinary rule-making discretion. For example, the decree
might provide: "The agency shall possess discretion to amend any
rule promulgated pursuant to this decree that is equivalent to its
ordinary legal discretion to amend or rescind agency rules." Any
decree that so protects the agency avoids the issue of whether the
agency can agree to constrain its discretion and it leaves the
revisability of the agency's discretion unimpaired.
In some cases, however, that strategy may be impracticable.
Consider, for example, EPA's settlement promise to investigate
specified industries not mentioned in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act for possible toxic pollution regulation." Ordinarily, a
decision to investigate a particular respondent in a regulatory con-
text is left to the unreviewable discretion of an administrative
agency.2 The only way that EPA could promise to investigate par-
ticular industries and still retain its ordinary discretion not to in-
vestigate those industries would be to provide that its commitment
in this respect was absolutely unenforceable. It would be an odd
plaintiff who would be willing to settle a lawsuit in return for such
a promise. Thus, in order to obtain settlement in a lawsuit chal-
lenging agency nonenforcement of a statute, an agency usually has
to limit its discretion to some degree.
No federal statute, however, squarely authorizes or prohibits
discretion-binding agreements of this sort. An agency's authority
to constrain its discretion beyond those limits imposed by a regula-
tory statute itself would have to be derived by implication.
Whether such authority can be inferred from the regulatory stat-
ute at issue, the Administrative Procedure Act, or the authority of
90 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
See text at notes 12-28.
92 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United
States in litigation raises a classic Youngstown-type problem: how
to determine the scope of executive statutory authority in the ab-
sence of any statutory language expressly permitting or prohibiting
the contemplated executive initiative.13
It is fair to say that the executive would not have authority to
promise to exercise its administrative discretion in contravention
of a regulatory statute.94 Thus, for example, if a statute prescribes
ten exclusive decision-making criteria with respect to a particular
regulatory decision, the implementing agency could not promise to
be bound by an eleventh unnamed factor or to ignore one of the
ten. 5 Even if such a promise were plausibly in the interest of the
United States as a matter of policy, the Attorney General would
presumably lack the authority to make it in the face of a specific
congressional determination that a different regulatory strategy
was in the interest of the United States as a matter of law.
Such promises are unlikely, however. What is much more
likely is a proffered plan of statutory implementation that (a) is
reasonably consistent with the underlying regulatory statute, (b) is
reasonably proffered in settlement as being in the interest of the
United States, but (c) imposes greater constraints on the discretion
of the agency than are imposed by the regulatory statute itself.96
93 As is well known, Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), invalidated, for
lack of statutory or independent presidential authority, the President's order seizing steel
mills to insure steel production for the Korean War. Nonetheless, the opinions of six Jus-
tices-three dissenters and three in the majority-expressly state that circumstances may
exist in which the absence of statutory authority does not preclude presidential initiatives
vis-a-vis subject matter that Congress is also empowered to regulate. 343 U.S. at 610-11
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 662 (Clark, J., con-
curring); id. at 683 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
94 In any such case, the President would be acting where his power "is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
In the field of domestic economic and social regulation, the President has no apparent con-
stitutional authority that is immune to congressional regulation.
95 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
9' In making such a promise, the executive could plausibly assert that it was acting
pursuant to an implied authorization by Congress. In this situation, the President's "author-
ity is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). An alterna-
tive argument, with identical impact, is that if Congress has neither expressly granted nor
denied the President authority to limit his ordinary statutory discretion, then his assertion
of authority to do so falls within the "zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Id. at 637. In particular, the
President's power to execute the laws faithfully could colorably be read as embracing a gen-
eral power to implement the more general purposes that underlie Congress's express statu-
tory commands, and "congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" invites him to do so.
Id.
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Divining congressional "intent" with respect to such a discretion-
ary decision-that is, a discretionary decision to constrain future
regulatory discretion-involves a sensible imputation of congres-
sional purpose in light of a careful assessment of the reasonable-
ness of the agency's promise.
The Supreme Court has held that, outside the context of liti-
gation, agencies with general regulatory authority may impose on
themselves procedural requirements going beyond the minimal re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") or the
specific substantive statute being implemented.97 An agency, for
example, that is authorized to adopt a regulatory policy through
informal APA rule making would be authorized to decide, on its
own initiative, to determine that policy entirely based on a pub-
licly disclosed rule-making docket-a discretion-constraining de-
vice not ordinarily required in informal rule making. Presumably,
the inference that agencies enjoy such authority is based on the
premise that an expert agency might rationally conclude that pro-
cedural requirements going beyond minimal statutory mandates
would result in a sounder or more effective implementation of the
agency's substantive obligations. If Congress is deemed to have au-
thorized agencies generally to impose on themselves procedural re-
quirements going beyond explicit statutory minima, it is hard to
see why Congress should not be deemed to have granted power to
make similar decisions in settlement of litigation when those deci-
sions would likewise implement the agency's obligations and pro-
tect the interests of the United States in litigation.
This analysis, however, requires that the agency make a con-
scientious assessment of the reasonableness of its promise. A prom-
ise to maintain a particular rule in place subject to future amenda-
tory rule makings on an exclusive public rule-making docket seems
a fairly narrow intrusion into the agency's ordinary amendatory
discretion and facially unobjectionable, no matter what the sub-
stantive statute at issue. Similarly, a nonrevisable promise to in-
vestigate particular industries as part of a regulatory effort might
be viewed as acceptable because it does not directly infringe on the
agency's discretion to make substantive policy or require even that
a regulation ultimately issue. On the other hand, a promise to
maintain a rule in place for ten years absent "exigent circum-
97 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978) ("Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise
of their discretion ... ").
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stances" or a "national emergency" would appear such a bizarre
departure from ordinary administrative procedure-a procedure
that Congress has never adopted for any regulation whatso-
ever-that authority to make such a promise could not reasonably
be implied merely from a general authorizing statute and the At-
torney General's broad authority to conduct litigation. Even if
such a promise might be regarded in some circumstances as rea-
sonably in the interests of the United States, both its novelty and
the extremity of its intrusion into ordinarily revisable agency dis-
cretion should be deemed to render it unreasonable without clear
congressional authorization.
3. Summary. The foregoing discussion can be distilled into a
set of general principles regarding executive authority to render or-
dinarily revisable discretionary executive decisions into less revis-
able discretionary executive decisions through the medium of an
enforceable settlement agreement.
First, the executive lacks authority to make promises to bind
its future discretion: (a) when the discretion involved is constitu-
tionally vested, and a promise to render such discretion less revis-
able cannot be justified by an overriding public interest within the
constitutional authority of the executive to protect; or (b) when
the discretion involved is statutorily vested, and a promise to
render such discretion less revisable is in contravention of statute
or cannot reasonably be regarded as within Congress's authoriza-
tion. A promise to render statutory discretion less revisable should
be regarded as implicitly authorized if the promise is (1) a reasona-
ble means of implementing the underlying regulatory statute, and
(2) reasonably in the interests of the United States in litigation.
Second, in any suit in which the United States is unable to
promise legally to render its policy-making discretion less revis-
able, it may still make discretion-related promises a part of a con-
sent decree and avoid constitutional problems through proper
drafting of the decree. If the United States is the defendant, it
may avoid constitutional problems by conditioning any promise to
exercise discretion on behalf of the plaintiff on the retention by the
United States of the ordinary revisability of its discretion. In any
case in which the United States is the plaintiff, it may avoid con-
stitutional problems by conditioning a promise to exercise discre-
tion on behalf of the defendant on an understanding that the
promise is unenforceable, or unenforceable through any order that
constrains the United States in the exercise of its discretionary de-
cision making.
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B. Judicial Authority to Approve Constraints
on Executive Discretion
The entry of a consent decree binding the United States im-
plicates not only the authority of the executive, but the authority
of a court as well. Once the problem of executive authority is
solved, however, the problem of judicial authority poses no further
obstacles because a court may approve any consent decree that
embodies a discretion-constraining promise that the United States
is legally authorized to make.
The Justice Department does not share this view and has ar-
gued, most vigorously in the affirmative action context, that courts
approving consent decrees are limited to approving remedial mea-
sures that could have been imposed on the consenting defendants
after trial. 8 Specifically, the Justice Department has repeatedly
urged federal courts not to approve voluntary race-conscious reme-
dial measures that go beyond such race-conscious measures as a
court might impose on a defendant found liable for discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 The Department
draws its strongest support for this position from Firefighters v.
Stotts,100 the much-publicized case involving minority layoffs in
the Memphis Fire Department.
98 It is the Attorney General's position that:
(a) In suits actually tried against the United States, courts may not initiate re-
medial orders that restrict the exercise of ordinarily revisable executive discretion;
(b) "[lit is [therefore] constitutionally impermissible for the courts to enter con-
sent decrees containing such provisions ......
Attorney General's Guidelines at 181 (cited in note 3). This is assertedly so, although "[tihe
Attorney General has plenary authority to settle cases tried under his direction, including
authority to enter into settlement agreements that a court could not order if the suit were
tried to conclusion." Id.
This position shows the categorical version of the separation of powers in its
purest-that is, in its least functionally-oriented-form. Given that settlement agreements
are enforceable contracts, the primary practical difference between settlement agreements
and consent decrees is that settlement agreements permit the executive to breach and be
sued (but not risk contempt as a sanction), while departures from consent decrees risk con-
tempt, among other remedies, unless based on previously granted judicial modifications. If
this difference is constitutional in magnitude, it is not because of the enforceability of the
executive's agreement, but only because of the enforcement procedure involved. However,
because courts are reluctant to hold federal agencies or officers in contempt for violating
consent decrees (see, for example, In re Attorney General of United States, 596 F.2d 58, 65
(2d Cir. 1979) (holding Attorney General in contempt "should be a last resort, to be under-
taken only after all other means to achieve the ends legitimately sought by the court have
been exhausted")), the distinction is of minimal practical significance. Given these practical-
ities, it is unsurprising that legal support for the Attorney General's argument is weak.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
100 467 U.S. 561 (1984). That case, however, involved a distinct issue, namely, limita-
tions on a court's power to modify a consent decree in a manner not anticipated in the
original decree and over the objections of one of the parties. Id. at 576 n.9.
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When the Supreme Court in 1986, in Local Number 93 v. City
of Cleveland,10 1 considered the scope of a federal court's authority
to approve remedial measures agreed to in a consent decree, six
Justices emphatically rejected the Justice Department's position.
The Court held that the boundaries of permissible agreement be-
tween consenting parties were set by their legal authority to enter
into the promises made, not by the court's authority to impose
remedies after trial:
[I]n addition to the law which forms the basis of the
claim, the parties' consent animates the legal force of a
consent decree. Therefore, a federal court is not necessa-
rily barred from entering a consent decree merely be-
cause the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial.
This is not to say that the parties may agree to take
action that conflicts with or violates the statute upon
which the complaint was based . . . [T]he fact that the
parties have consented to the relief contained in a decree
does not render their action immune from attack on the
ground that it violates [the federal statute underlying the
claim] or the Constitution. However,... to the extent the
consent decree is not otherwise shown to be unlawful, the
court is not barred from entering a consent decree merely
because it might lack authority . . . to do so after a
trial. 102
Under this analysis, the limits on judicial power to approve a dis-
cretion-limiting consent decree involving a federal agency derive
not from the court's remedial authority, but from limits on the
agency's legal authority to constrain its own discretion. Any prom-
ise an agency is empowered to make, a court is empowered to ap-
prove as part of a consent decree.
This is all the more sensible if one reflects on the role of a
court after a trial that the agency loses. Once an agency is found
liable for its failure to implement a statute properly, a federal
court is not ordinarily empowered to direct the way in which the
agency's discretion is to be exercised in fulfilling its statutory obli-
gations. A court may, however, demand a proposed plan of compli-
ance or issue declaratory relief and retain jurisdiction to insure
101 06 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
102 Id. at 3077-78 (citations omitted).
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that the agency subsequently exercises its discretion in a manner
that affords the plaintiffs relief.1 03 In any such case, the court that
reviews agency compliance under a judgment is essentially in the
same position it faces when reviewing an agency's proffered con-
sent decree: its task is to determine whether the agency's chosen
means of statutory implementation reasonably fulfills its legal
mandate.
The only substantial legal difference between the role of a
court reviewing a proposed consent decree and its role after trial is
that the court derives its review authority in the consent decree
situation from the parties' consent, and in the post-trial context
from the adjudication of agency liability. In either case the pros-
pect exists for limited judicial supervision of agency policy making.
Thus, in order for the Justice Department's position to be sus-
tained, the fact that the source of a court's remedial authority dif-
fers in the consent decree and post-trial contexts would have to
imply that consent cannot yield remedial authority as extensive as
adjudication. In other words, in the Justice Department's view, a
determination of liability would have to precede judicial involve-
ment in the settlement of any statutory case in which fulfillment of
the agency's statutory mandate ordinarily contemplates some exer-
cise of policy-making discretion; only a finding of a legal violation
would authorize supervisory judicial remedies. There is no appar-
ent functional justification for such a position, however. It is belied
by the obvious value of consent decrees to the federal government
in the conservation of time and legal resources. 104
Although separation of powers principles do not limit judicial
authority to approve consent decrees embodying lawful executive
promises, they should play a role in the enforcement of the decree.
This is true with respect to the interpretation of decrees, enter-
taining requests for modification, and enforcing decrees in the face
of executive noncompliance.
First, in interpreting a consent decree, courts should be reluc-
tant to conclude that an agency has promised to render its admin-
103 See, for example, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp.
125, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aft'd, 608 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1979).
101 Indeed, the Justice Department's position that a determination of liability must
precede supervisory remedies would seem to apply equally to all remedies. That is, the entry
of any consent decree against the government without such a determination would seem-
ingly exceed a court's powers because it would be the imposition of a judicial remedy with-
out a finding of executive branch wrongdoing. By precluding all consent decrees, this in-
sight, of course, would drastically curtail the executive branch's present discretion to
conduct litigation in the interest of the United States.
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istrative discretion less revisable. Where Congress has vested
largely revisable discretion in an agency, preserving that discretion
ordinarily furthers Congress's policy intentions. Congress may li-
cense departures from the revisability of discretion where a settle-
ment on such terms reasonably implements the governing statute
and is otherwise in the interest of the United States. A court
should conclude that an agency has made such judgments, how-
ever, only if the decree's language or extrinsic evidence demon-
strates that the agency made those determinations on a reasoned
basis.
Second, a court should respect the separation of powers in re-
viewing requests for modification of a consent decree. This means
at least that, in reviewing a private party's proposals for the modi-
fication of a decree over United States objections, a court should
not ordinarily impose modifications that go farther than the origi-
nal decree or the underlying law in constraining agency policy-
making discretion. A more complex question is whether, in review-
ing executive proposals for the modification of a discretion-limiting
decree over a private party's objections, a court should apply a
lesser standard than applies to the review of modification requests
in the ordinary consent decree case. A flexible standard for modifi-
cation of "consistency with the public interest and the original
purposes of the consent decree" would better take account of the
ordinary revisability of an agency's discretion, and might prevent
consent decrees entered into by one administration from exces-
sively constraining the policy choices of another. This standard is
in keeping with recommendations that have already been sug-
gested for litigation aimed at other forms of institutional reform." 5
On the other hand, adoption of a lenient modification standard
might inhibit other parties from settling with the government be-
cause it would reduce the reliability of the government's settle-
105 See generally Note, Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1986). Indeed, a more flexible stance on modification might be
more justified in the typical administrative lawsuit than in institutional suits involving con-
stitutional rights. As noted above (see note 4) the governmental discretion limited by consti-
tutional remedies is not so much part of the primary constitutional design as an inevitable
artifact of conferring obligations on the government in broad terms. The fact that a consti-
tutional decree interferes with what would otherwise be executive discretion to implement
the Constitution does not seem especially troubling so long as the decree represents a good
faith agreement by the government and plaintiffs as to how a constitutional mandate should
be fulfilled. Administrative law litigation, however, may implicate executive discretion that
was purposefully left by the Constitution or by Congress to the executive. Courts might
legitimately, therefore, be more protective of executive discretion per se in the remedial
stage of such lawsuits.
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ment promises. As noted earlier, any such move in the name of
protecting future discretion would limit the executive's present
discretion to settle lawsuits as it deems appropriate.
Finally, in enforcing a decree against an agency, courts should
try to avoid remedial steps that unduly control an agency's exer-
cise of discretion. If a court finds it necessary to enforce a decree
through additional injunctive or declaratory relief, the court should
go no further in specifying subsequent agency behavior than is
minimally necessary to afford a reasonable prospect of ultimate
agency compliance. Courts should indulge, absent compelling con-
trary indications, a presumption of executive good faith in re-
sponding to judicial orders, whether in the consent decree or post-
trial remedial context. 0
6
III. PROCEDURAL LIMITS ON DISCRETION-LIMITING
CONSENT DECREES
Even if there is substantive authority for discretion-limiting
consent decrees, a court and the executive must respect procedural
rules in the entry of such decrees that account for their potential
impact on third-party rights. The possibility of such impacts is not
peculiar to discretion-limiting consent decrees. It exists with re-
spect to all settlements and, indeed, with respect to litigation gen-
erally. In all settings, litigants are bound by rules that limit the
legal impact of judgments on unrepresented third parties and rules
that facilitate representation, for example, through notice and the
prospect of intervention.
Because the mechanisms for third-party protection are so
thoroughly discussed elsewhere, 10 7 I do not want to dwell on their
details here. Instead, I would like to focus on the particular ways
in which third-party rights are likely to be affected by discretion-
limiting consent decrees, and suggest in a general way the kinds of
procedural responses that are most likely to be useful in protecting
third-party interests. The three key sources of danger to these in-
terests in the process of settlement are lack of representation, lack
of adversariness between the settling parties, and a lack of regard
for principle in the formulation of a decree.
10' See, for example, Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 700
(E.D. Va. 1973).
,01 See, for example, Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights
of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 128-144.
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A. Lack of Representation
Settlement negotiations are typically conducted in unpub-
licized, secret meetings among a limited number of parties. Inter-
ests importantly affected by particular litigation may thus go un-
represented and particular, difficult-to-organize constituencies may
never achieve effective participation.
Whether the lack of representation for third-party interests
calls for any systematic corrective in suits involving the exercise of
administrative discretion is difficult to assess without more data as
to the actual pattern of settlement behavior among administrative
agencies. 10 8 Often, such exclusion is not a real problem. For exam-
ple, although settlement negotiations may go unpublicized, organ-
ized interests affected by the regulatory activity of a particular
agency may be engaged in such thorough and routine monitoring
of the agency's activities that the facts of ongoing litigation and
prospective settlement are well-known to the relevant commu-
nity.10 9 Such actual knowledge may be sufficient to assure that
such persons or groups potentially affected by settlement can take
timely advantage of the opportunity to intervene in the litigation.
Unorganized interests may still go unrepresented, but it is an open
question whether they would be any more represented at the reme-
dial stage of an adjudicated lawsuit. It is equally uncertain whether
they would be any better represented if the decisions being made
in the context of settlement were being made in Congress or by the
agency through ordinary administrative processes.
The interests of non-negotiators are further protected by rules
that require notice of settlement in particular cases or that limit
the legal impact a settlement may have on any person who was not
party to the settlement. Class actions against administrative agen-
cies may not be settled, for example, without notice to all class
members. 110 Moreover, settlements in particular classes of cases
may proceed, under statute or regulation, only pursuant to public
notice published in the Federal Register."'
18 The most helpful published discussion in terms of data on actual practice is Jeffrey
A. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 Geo. L.J. 1241, 1246-48 (1985),
which reports on the role of settlement agreements in EPA rule-making practice.
101 Id. at 1276.
1 0 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e). See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and
Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 579, 589-93.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) (requiring judicial public interest determination as pre-
requisite to entry of antitrust consent decrees); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1985) (mandating public
notice and comment opportunity before Department of Justice agreement to entry of con-
sent judgments in antipollution cases).
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The nature of a settlement also may mitigate the impact of
third-party exclusion. If an agency, pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment, promises only to issue a notice of proposed rule making on a
particular subject, persons who did not participate in the negotia-
tion of that promise may comment on the proposed rule. Thus,
they will not be wholly excluded from the substance of agency de-
cision making on the question at issue."'
Still, mere recitation of the factors potentially mitigating the
problems of lack of representation is hardly sufficient to eliminate
these problems completely. The potential social impact of lawsuits
concerning the exercise of agency discretion is often great, as is
illustrated by the cases discussed above on the regulation of envi-
ronmental toxics, school desegregation, and housing assistance for
poor people."' Further, the cost of providing general notice of pro-
posed settlement through the Federal Register is small.1 4 It is
likely, therefore, that public notice would be salutary with regard
to discretion-limiting consent decrees or, at least, with regard to
some particular subset of such settlements-for example, settle-
ments contemplating the issuance of proposed rules, either gener-
ally or in particular subject matter areas.
Whether further steps are necessary to avoid the exclusion of
difficult-to-organize interests requires additional study. Perhaps
agencies should be required to undertake some initiative to assure
representation for interests shared by an otherwise unorganized
constituency. To sustain any such proposal, however, it would be
helpful to have a much clearer picture as to howmany settlements
are likely involved and whether exclusion is a genuine problem in
such suits.
B. Lack of Adversariness Between Settling Parties
Non-adversary settlements can also compromise third-party
interests. For example, an agency's settlement may be shaped more
by the agency's internal political agenda or by its responsiveness to
an ongoing relationship with the suing party or parties than by a
faithful, disinterested assessment of the most appropriate imple-
mentation of its statutory responsibilities. 1 5 That is, the agency
"' See Gaba, 73 Geo. L.J. at 1267-68 (cited in note 108).
"' See text at notes 12-59.
11 Gaba, 73 Geo. L.J. at 1275-76 (cited in note 108).
", See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Continuing Relations in
the Administrative Process, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 741, 746.
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may be motivated by factors other than those Congress has
deemed to be in the public interest. The now-venerable shorthand
phrase for the latter phenomenon is "agency capture."
It is by no means unthinkable that an administrative agency
might find a consent decree a useful device for "binding" itself to
something it wants to do anyway, perhaps to avoid conspicuous re-
sponsibility for an unpopular policy initiative, to prevent a change
of policy by a subsequent administration, or as leverage in inter-
and intra-branch negotiations over budgeting. Where the proposed
settlement is substantively authorized, however, it will be difficult
to smoke out such cases.116 The best courts could do in reviewing
consent decrees would be to require statements, akin to the state-
ments of basis and purpose that must accompany agency rules,117
as to why an agency regards a consent decree as an appropriate
means of statutory implementation and otherwise in the interests
of the United States in litigation. The articulation of such an anal-
ysis cannot assure that other motivations animating the consent
decree are absent. Yet, more intrusive judicial attempts to police
the agency's willingness to settle litigation would themselves re-
present questionable intrusion in the agency's discretionary policy
making.
Perhaps it is heartening in this respect that the risk of agency
capture, as an impetus for collusion or half-hearted bargaining,
does not appear very great with respect to many of the lawsuits
that have produced discretion-limiting consent decrees. As others
have observed, the possibilities of agency capture antithetical to
the public interest are greatest when the only organized actors are
the agency and the regulatees. Accusations of agency capture are
most credible with respect to the economic regulatory agencies,
such as the ICC or FCC, which regulate on an industry-by-industry
basis.'"" It is of considerable significance not only that the agency
might be staffed by former industry personnel or might actually
depend on industry lobbyists for information, 1 9 but also that these
agencies' statutory mandates are often so broad as to provide little
116 Indeed, there is no certainty, even in cases pressed to judgment, that the relief im-
posed on an agency is unwelcome. An agency may contest a complaint only nominally to
secure a "friendly" judgment against itself without the appearance of collusion.
117 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
,,8 See Rabin, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. at 746 (cited in note 115); Richard B. Stewart, The
Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis.
L. Rev. 655, 660-66 (1985).
119 See Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 168-172 (2d ed. 1985).
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statutory counterweight to industry demands for understanding
and accommodation. 120
Social regulatory agencies such as OSHA or the EPA, on the
other hand, police problems such as workplace hazards or pollu-
tion, not individual industries. Further, the policies behind these
agencies' statutory authorizations are typically more focused in the
relevant statutes and often embodied in more precise commands.
These factors-coupled with the organization over the last fifteen
to twenty years of public interest groups shaped to defend the pol-
icies underlying regulatory statutes-create a much lesser risk of
agency capture. The pattern of ongoing informal relationships for
such agencies is typically triangular-agency, public interest
groups, and regulatees. With respect to agency capture:
Tripartite continuing relationships have precisely the op-
posite effect of two-party arrangements. Instead of pro-
moting informality, when a third-party group sets out to
monitor agency-clientele relations, systematic pressures
towards formality and "going by the book" are created. 1 '
Indeed, there seems to be some substantial sentiment within the
administrative law community that some administrative programs
could be better conducted under a regime of cooperative decision
making by an agency and the parties with whom the agency has an
ongoing relationship.122 If the risk of agency capture in un-
supervised policy making itself seems reduced these days, the risk
of collusive settlements-which occur at least under the nominal
supervision of a court-seems a fortiori to be of even lesser
concern.
C. Lack of Attention to Principle
"Negotiation," as Professor Melvin Eisenberg has written, "is
conventionally perceived as a relatively norm-free process centered
on the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into agree-
120 See Lewis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1183,
1188-91 (1973). Even so, the debate whether agency capture always disserves the public
interest is not wholly one-sided. See Stewart, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. at 665-66 (cited in note 118).
121 Rabin, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. at 747 (cited in note 115).
122 See, for example, Joel F. Handler, Continuing Relationships and the Administrative
Process: Social Welfare, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 687, 691-99 (arguing for cooperative decisionmak-
ing in the administration of special education); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982) (offering negotiated rule making as a solution to
problems characteristic of regulation under an adversary model).
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ment by the exercise of power, horse-trading, threat and bluff." '123
By contrast, "[a]djudication is conventionally perceived as a norm-
bound process centered on the establishment of facts and the de-
termination and application of principles, rules, and prece-
dents. ' 124 To the extent these perceptions are accurate, lawmaking
by settlement is even more dangerous to third parties than law-
making by litigation pressed to judgment, even though only a few
of the affected interests may be represented in either case.
There is, however, as Professor Eisenberg details, good reason
to doubt the starkness of this comparison between negotiation and
adjudication. Negotiations over settling disputes that arise from
past events typically do invoke principles, rules, and precedents.125
The chief difference is that the lesser formality of negotiation may
broaden the universe of acceptably relevant norms and the options
for accommodating a broad range of interests in the form of a set-
tlement. 26 This is less true in negotiations over the future behav-
ior of some party-an administrative agency, for example-but
only if one party has an alternative to negotiation, such as buying
a desired good from a different seller, that obviates any sensitivity
on its part to considerations other than sheer bargaining power. 127
Applying these insights to administrative law litigation, it is
difficult to diagnose any risk of unprincipled settlements that justi-
fies the adoption of special prophylactic rules governing executive
settlements. To the extent there is an imbalance in bargaining
power in suits brought by individuals, it may well be the Justice
Department, not the private plaintiff, who has greater.resources for
the maintenance of litigation. As between the Justice Department
and organized plaintiffs-whether advocates for private industry,
organized labor or a public interest group-litigating power is
probably balanced sufficiently to make disparate resources a fairly
inconsequential determinant of the shape of final settlement. 28 To
2 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1976).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 638-65.
126 Id.
'1 Id. at 665-72.
12M Commenting on an earlier draft, Professor Peter Strauss remarked that he is wary
of assessments such as these concerning the government's litigating resources. Perhaps most
tellingly, he emphasizes that the demands on government litigating agencies are uniquely
great, so that the "opportunity cost" to the government of matching private resources de-
voted to any particular suit may be prohibitive. Nonetheless, based on my own more limited
experience as a government lawyer, I find it difficult to believe that the federal government
is regularly giving up more than it should in settlements because of an imbalance in
resources.
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the extent the shadow of litigation exerts a force over settlement
negotiations, it is just as likely that the parties' respective esti-
mates of likely success will determine their behavior as that the
cost of litigation will do so. And these estimates, of course, are go-
ing to be based substantially "on the establishment of facts and
the determination and application of principles, rules, and prece-
dents' 1 29 that is ideally characteristic of adjudication.
In sum, the process of lawmaking by consent decree would
likely be more protective of third-party rights, and at little cost, if
notices of proposed settlements, at least in certain classes of im-
portant cases, were published in the Federal Register and if agen-
cies were required to provide statements defending proposed con-
sent decrees as rational means of implementing their
responsibilities and protecting the interests of the United States in
litigation. Additionally, it might prove appropriate on further
study to require agencies to undertake some initiative to assure
representation in the settlement process for interests shared by an
otherwise unorganized constituency. My own conclusion, however,
is that the risks to third-party rights from lack of representation, a
lack of adversariness between the settling parties, or inattention to
matters of principle in the settlement process are not so great as to
require more drastic protections from consent decrees than from
other settlements or judgments that potentially affect such third-
party rights.
IV. DISCRETION-LIMITING CONSENT DECREES AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF PUBLIC LAW
Perhaps the most strenuous criticisms of discretion-limiting
decrees focus not on their legality, but on their appropriateness as
a matter of policy. Even if such decrees are lawful, executive resort
to their use is itself discretionary. Thus, executive participation in
the decrees appears to be a policy endorsement of lawmaking by
settlement generally, and a ratification specifically of policy mak-
ing by a kind of settlement that legitimates some degree of judicial
supervision of agency policy making.
A dramatic example of a policy-oriented attack on lawmaking
by settlement generally is Professor Fiss's denunciation of consent
'19 Eisenberg, 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 638 (cited in note 123).
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decrees in public litigation as privatized lawmaking. In Professor
Fiss's view, advocates of settlement make "settlement appear as a
perfect substitute for judgment . . . by trivializing the remedial
dimensions of a lawsuit, and also by reducing the social function of
the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes.... "13 Fiss argues,
in contrast:
[T]he purpose of adjudication should be understood in
broader terms. Adjudication uses public resources, and
employs . . . public officials . . . [who] possess a power
that has been defined and conferred by public law, not by
private agreement. Their job is not to maximize the ends
of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in au-
thoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties
settle. 3'
It is of critical concern to Professor Fiss that settlements, because
they rest on consent, do not "contain the kind of enforcement com-
mitment 132 implicit in a post-trial judgment. Even where the set-
tlement appears in a consent decree, enforcement is impeded be-
cause the absence of a trial leaves the judge relatively ignorant of
the background necessary to determine the sufficiency of perform-
ance under the decree, and because courts are often reluctant to
use performance-oriented remedies against high officials to enforce
essentially contractual obligations. 33
If administrative lawmaking consisted only of consent decrees
or other settlement agreements, I could more readily understand
Professor Fiss's concern. Regulatory law, however, does not consist
even nearly of settlements alone. Not only do many major disputes
proceed to a final contested judgment, but congressional hearings
and administrative procedures, both rule makings and adjudica-
tions, provide frequent occasions for the elaboration and vindica-
tion of public values. The legislative and executive branches are no
less public institutions than courts. It is thus difficult to share Pro-
fessor Fiss's concern that society is foregoing, in the name of expe-
"'0 Owen F. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
131 Id.
132 Id.
,3' Id. at 1082-85.
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dient settlements, its genuine need for authoritative interpreta-
tions of administrative law through public processes.'
In contrast to Professor Fiss's general antipathy to settlement,
the Justice Department has expressed a specific hostility to discre-
tion-limiting consent decrees. This hostility is part and parcel of a
broad Reagan Administration attempt to revive and give new life
to a "categorical" model of the separation of powers, in which a
fundamental aim of public administration is to confine Congress,
the executive, and the courts, respectively, to three categories of
tasks-making, implementing, and interpreting law. Although the
Administration's advocacy of this model has met with recent suc-
cess in the Supreme Court, 3 5 the categorical model runs against
the grain of recent Supreme Court opinions that take a functional
view of the separation of powers.3 6
s This paragraph apparently aligns me with Judge Easterbrook in entertaining at
least a rebuttable preference for dispute settlement by agreement. See Frank H. Easter-
brook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 19. I differ, how-
ever, in one major respect from Judge Easterbrook's adherence to the contract model in
divining the scope of appropriate settlement authority for government agencies. See also
McConnell, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 300-04 (cited in note 74) (executive power to constrain
discretion not expanded when negotiating consent decrees). The executive's contracting
power emanates from Congress, not from the common law, and Congress may well have
reasons to confer more or less contracting authority in the litigation settlement context than
in other areas. It is thus not possible to adopt any easy assumption that the scope of govern-
ment contracting power in settlement and in, say, ordinary procurement, is identical, while
analogous assumptions about the authority of private individuals might be sensible.
135 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating so-called "legislative vetoes" as
violative of the bicameralism requirement and Presentment Clauses of Article I); Bowsher v.
Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (invalidating, because of the Comptroller General's removabil-
ity by Congress, his mandatory authority over the executive under the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1986)). Although com-
mentators have used Chadha and Bowsher in defense of the "categorical model" of the
separation of powers, these cases actually dealt with discrete procedural questions that the
Constitution addresses with unusual explicitness, and may have little impact on the adjudi-
cation of broader separation of powers concerns.
"' For recent examples of functional analysis applied to separation of powers issues,
see Commodity Future Trading Commission v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986) (upholding
quasi-judicial agency authority to resolve state common law counterclaims in an administra-
tive proceeding); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (up-
holding quasi-judicial agency power to adjudicate compensation owed to pesticide manufac-
turer for a second manufacturer's use of the first's research data in connection with the
second's application for pesticide registration); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
(holding presidential advisers entitled to only qualified immunity in suits for damages based
on alleged unconstitutional conduct in office); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) (upholding congressional regulation of control over and access to Presi-
dent Nixon's confidential records).
The "categorical model" is the most formalistic response to a persistent malaise in ad-
ministrative law-a disquiet concerning just how we are to picture or "model" federal ad-
ministrative process in view of 'the ubiquitous presence of administrative discretion. For a
general discussion of this theme, see Robert L. Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A
Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 120 (1977).
POLICY MAKING BY CONSENT DECREE
As part of its campaign on behalf of the separation of powers,
the Justice Department, in March 1986, issued a series of "policy
Guidelines" concerning consent decrees and settlement agree-
ments. 137 In essence, they direct Justice Department lawyers not to
consent, in the settlement of litigation, to commitments that limit
otherwise revisable policy-making discretion vested in the execu-
tive branch by Constitution or statute. The proffered aim of these
Guidelines is "to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the
Courts and commentators early recognized the threat to the "categorical model" that is
posed by the so-called "independent" administrative agencies, which promulgate, enforce,
and interpret their own rules. Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935); James
M. Landis, The Administrative Process 115 (1938). Yet, even for administrators squarely
within the executive branch, the model does not hold. Simple awareness of these officials'
discretion over policy formulation, execution, and review renders problematic any attempted
constitutional compartmentalization of their tasks. Excluding the President, the Supreme
Court's one-time reference to "purely executive officers," Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at
632, seems to describe an empty set. (Even the Vice-President, who presides over the Sen-
ate, U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, par. 4, exercises some legislative power.)
Notwithstanding the theoretical problems that attend the "categorical model," the Rea-
gan Administration has staunchly adhered to it. Examples include the search for judges who
avow a philosophy of self-restraint in their review of decisions by elected officials, see, for
example, President's White House Briefing, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1276, 1278 (Oct.
21, 1985), and the Administration's attempted broad-gauged assertions of executive privi-
lege against Congress. Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Govern-
ment of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 Minn L. Rev.
461, 501-14 (1987) (discussing Reagan Administration executive privilege disputes concern-
ing former Secretary of the Interior James Watt and former Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford). Other examples include opposition to the
legislative veto-a long-standing executive cause, see, for example, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 928 (1983) (detailing Justice Department opposition to one-House veto of deportation
stay); challenges to the authority of the Comptroller General, an official not subject to presi-
dential removal, to issue orders that bind the executive in any aspect of government admin-
istration, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (invalidating, with executive concurrence,
Comptroller General's role in implementing the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.
1986) (upholding, over executive objections, Comptroller General's role in implementing the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 754
F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding, over executive objections, Comptroller General's sub-
poena powers under General Accounting Office Act of 1980); United States v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); and efforts to narrow the use of special
masters in government litigation, Memorandum from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to
All Assistant Attorneys General and All United States Attorneys Re: Department Policy
Regarding Special Masters (March 13, 1986). In each of these efforts, the Department of
Justice has argued the constitutional invalidity of institutional practices that the Adminis-
tration disapproves.
The Attorney General's latest initiative on behalf of this "pure" version of the separa-
tion of powers is a speech insisting that Supreme Court decisions do not create "a supreme
law of the land that is binding on all... parts of government, henceforth and forevermore."
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Meese Says Rulings By US High Court Don't Establish Law, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 23, 1986, p. 1, col. 6.
' Attorney General's Guidelines (cited in note 3).
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President and other officers of the Executive Branch, including
their policy-making discretion. 1 38 Without elaboration, the cover-
ing memorandum describes the Guidelines as "significant expres-
sions of our view of the Constitution." '
Given the significance that the Department attributed to the
Guidelines 40 and the Guidelines' purpose "to guide government
attorneys involved in the negotiation of consent decrees and settle-
ments," ' it seems odd that they were not drafted with greater
apparent care. The Guidelines include three directives for "consent
decrees" and three directives for "settlement agreements" that af-
fect agency discretion in rule making, management, and budgeting.
Yet the precise intent of each directive is obscured both by the
inartful phrasing of the Guidelines and the lack of a clear explica-
tion of the legal theory that underlies them.
A threshold source of confusion is the preamble's unexplained
assertion that separation of powers principles importantly limit the
appropriate use of consent decrees in litigation, but "settlement
agreements-similar in form to consent decrees, but not entered as
a order of the court-remain a perfectly permissible device for the
parties and should be strongly encouraged."' 42 Why this distinc-
tion is made, given the presumable judicial enforceability of all
lawful settlement agreements, 4 3 is not explained.
The first directives for both consent decrees and settlement
agreements concern promises regarding rule making. As to consent
decrees, the Guidelines state:
138 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Press Release 1 (March 21,
1986) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
139 Id.
140 This significance is signaled not only by the covering memorandum, but also by the
high level of attention the Guidelines received in the Department and by the press confer-
ence that accompanied their issuance. The Guidelines originated with an interdivisional De-
partment of Justice working group that based its recommendations chiefly on the profes-
sional experiences and perceptions of the working group's members, and not on a body of
reported decisions, or a written report analyzing the problems of discretion-limiting decrees.
Telephone Interview with Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (July 3, 1986). To be fair, the absence of a large base of
reported judicial decisions substantiating the existence of problems worth remedying does
not belie the Justice Department's perceptions in this respect because the settlements are
often not reflected in reported decisions.
1 Attorney General's Guidelines at 180 (cited in note 3).
14 Id. at 181.
143 Gerald R. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 95-102 (1983). The distinc-
tion is yet more puzzling because courts may enforce breached settlement agreements sum-
marily under their equity powers, further blurring the distinction between settlement agree-
ments and consent decrees. Timothy S. Jost, Commentary: The Attorney General's Policy
on Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 101, 102 and n.2 (1987).
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The department or agency should not enter into a con-
sent decree that converts into a mandatory duty the oth-
erwise discretionary authority of the Secretary or agency
administrator to revise, amend, or promulgate
regulations.""
As to settlement agreements, the Guidelines state:
The department or agency should not enter into a settle-
ment agreement that interferes with the Secretary or
agency administrator's authority to revise, amend, or
promulgate regulations through the procedures set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act. 45
The variations in the underlined phrases in these two direc-
tives raise a number of problems. To illustrate an important one,
imagine a plaintiff public interest group suing to require EPA to
perform its statutory obligation to protect against a particular pol-
lutant. EPA might contemplate promising to promulgate a rule (as
required by statute), and further promise that the rule would re-
main in force for five years, absent "exigent circumstances" requir-
ing a new rule making. The latter promise would seem to "interfere
with" the EPA Administrator's authority to "amend . . . regula-
tions," and, therefore, could not be the subject of a settlement
agreement. On the other hand, it would not "convert into a
mandatory duty the otherwise discretionary authority of the Secre-
tary or agency administrator to revise [or] amend" the regulation.
Thus, it would seem to follow that such a promise could be embod-
ied in a consent decree. This appears contrary to the general prem-
ises of the Guidelines as expressed in the preamble.
The second directives for consent decrees and settlement
agreements pertain to budgeting discretion. As to consent decrees,
the Guidelines state:
The department or agency should not enter into a con-
sent decree that either commits the department or
agency to expend funds that Congress has not appropri-
ated and that have not been budgeted for the action in
question, or commits a department or agency to seek a
particular appropriation or budget authorization.146
'4' Attorney General's Guidelines at 182 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
145 Id. (emphasis added).
16 Id. (emphasis added).
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As to settlement agreements:
The department or agency should not enter into a settle-
ment agreement that commits the department or agency
to expend funds that Congress has not appropriated and
that have not been budgeted for the action in question.14
The Attorney General's seeming concern is to prevent agencies
from rendering nonrevisable their revisable discretion over budget-
ing and budget requests. Yet, the Attorney General oddly regards
it as impermissible to promise "to seek a particular appropriation
or budget authorization" as part of a consent decree, but not as
part of a settlement agreement, even though the agreement is pre-
sumably an enforceable contract. Furthermore, it is seemingly only
the executive branch's budgeting prerogatives, not Congress's, that
are at issue. A commitment to expend funds is apparently permis-
sible if the funds "have ... been budgeted for the action in ques-
tion," even if "Congress has not appropriated" the funds. The
Guidelines are at best ambiguous on this point because it is un-
clear to what the word "budgeted" refers-Congress's budget or
the President's.
The third directives for consent decrees and settlement agree-
ments are catchall provisions. As to consent decrees, the Guide-
lines state:
The department or agency should not enter into a con-
sent decree that divests the Secretary or agency adminis-
trator, or his successors, of discretion committed to him
by Congress or the Constitution where such discretionary
power was granted to respond to changing circumstances,
to make policy or managerial choices, or to protect the
rights of third parties.148
As to settlement agreements, the Guidelines state:
In any settlement agreement in which the Secretary or
agency administrator agrees to exercise his discretion in a
particular way, where such discretionary power was com-
mitted to him by Congress or the Constitution to respond
to changing circumstances, to make policy or managerial
choices, or to protect the rights of third parties, the sole
remedy for the department or agency's failure to comply
117 Id. at 182-83.
,48 Id. at 182.
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with those terms of the settlement agreement should be
the revival of the suit.149
These provisions, too, are fairly puzzling. First, they refer to dis-
cretion conferred on a Secretary or administrator "by the Consti-
tution." It is not clear what these references mean. The Constitu-
tion confers executive authority only upon the President,150 who
may presumably delegate it within limits.
Second, the consent decree catchall guideline, but no other
guideline for consent decrees or for settlement agreements, cau-
tions against binding successors in office. Clearly, the possible
(and, I suspect, unintended) implications of that reference here
and its omission elsewhere are numerous.
Third, it is hard to intuit the precise contents of that category
of discretion vested (by Congress or otherwise) that is intended to
enable the decision maker "to respond to changing circumstances,
to make policy or managerial choices, or to protect the rights of
third parties." Do these criteria embrace all legally vested discre-
tion? If not, what is omitted?
But, for purposes of separation of powers analysis, one puzzle
looms overall. Lawyers may commit in settlement agreements to
nonrevisable exercises of policy-making discretion, so long as "the
sole remedy for the department or agency's failure to comply with
those terms of the settlement agreement [shall] be the revival of
the suit." It seems unquestionable, however, that the inclusion of a
similar remedies-limiting provision in a consent decree would elim-
inate any possible separation of powers problem in that context as
well. Why, then, is it not sufficient to apply the settlement agree-
ment directive to both settlement agreements and consent
decrees?
Such inartfulness in the drafting of the Guidelines obviously
means that, although the Department had a theory of constitu-
tional law it intended to express through the Guidelines, it had not
worked that theory out as clearly as it should have. My intuition,
however, suggests that the Guidelines have additional significance.
It may be that the Guidelines were animated less by a precise legal
theory than by a relatively nondiscriminating ideological stance-a
119 Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
110 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, par. 1. The Constitution speaks of subordinate administra-
tive officers only in reference to their manner of appointment, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, par. 2,
their liability for impeachment, U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, and the President's authority to
request written opinions from the heads of departments. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, par. 1.
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kind of broad policy objection to a model of judicial power that the
Attorney General rejects. 151
The model of administrative law that I believe the Guidelines
reject is well captured by Professor Stewart's seminal 1975 article
on the reformation of modern administrative law" and his 1982
article with Professor Sunstein on the evolution of beneficiary
rights under administrative statutes.153 The traditional model of
administrative law described by Stewart in the former article-the
model the Justice Department prefers-envisioned judicial review
as a bulwark against unlawful governmental intrusions into private
rights of liberty or property. 154 In contrast, the newer conception of
administrative law-the conception to which the Justice Depart-
ment is hostile-focuses less on protecting traditional spheres of
private autonomy through bipolar litigation, than on legitimating
the exercise of broad statutory power over society by reconciling,
in multipolar controversies, the competing claims of government
agencies, statutory beneficiaries, and regulated interests. 55 Stewart
viewed the judicial developments pointing in this newer direction
as coalescing around a model of administrative law as "interest
representation.' ' 156 Whether or not Stewart's proffered model is the
only conception that captures the spirit of the modern develop-
ments he chronicles, those developments are undeniable and pro-
foundly important for administrative agencies. Key among them
are a broadening of judicially cognizable interests that may be pro-
5 ' Indeed, I think it a fair guess that the Attorney General's Guidelines were substan-
tially motivated not by concerns about discretion-limiting consent decrees per se, but by an
aversion to the recognition of any statutory cause of action permitting judicial supervision of
administrative policy.
Alternatively, it may be that the Attorney General actually prefers to litigate suits of
the kind described above in Part I of this article because, if the executive finds a judge who
shares the Attorney General's sentiments, the executive branch may avoid any liability for,
say, the systematic nonenforcement of a statute. A sympathetic judge may read the underly-
ing statutory duty narrowly or avoid the claim for coercive relief on procedural grounds.
Fueling that hope, however, would be about as far as the Guidelines could go in avoiding
discretion-limiting remedies. The reason is that the causes of action that lead to such reme-
dies are rooted in many regulatory statutes. The Supreme Court may facilitate more or less
stringent judicial supervision of administration under these laws through its own approaches
to statutory interpretation. Only Congress, however, can systematically uproot the vision of
public law against which the Attorney General rebels, and it does not yet appear much
interested in doing so.
12 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667 (1975).
3 Richard B. Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 1195 (1982).
1" Stewart, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1669-70 (cited in note 152).
Id. at 1756.
156 Id. at 1760.
[1987:
POLICY MAKING BY CONSENT DECREE
tected through litigation, and an acceptance of the appropriateness
of enforcing beneficiary claims through affirmative judicial com-
mands to agencies. It is this latter development that the Attorney
General perceives as offending the separation of powers principle.
The development of beneficiary remedies is further elaborated
by Stewart and Sunstein in their 1982 article. They explain that
the recent evolution in our prevailing understanding of the pur-
poses of administrative law has produced, as a major innovation,
the acceptance of a so-called "right of initiation" against adminis-
trative agencies. 157 Unlike the traditional private right of defense
against agencies, which permits regulated parties to challenge
agency action as excessive, the right of initiation permits statutory
beneficiaries to challenge administrative performance as
inadequate.
In some cases, the beneficiaries' claim is one precisely of initia-
tion. For example, it may be alleged that an agency is unlawfully
withholding action that is statutorily compelled or at least re-
fraining from action for reasons that Congress has not. authorized
as the basis for agency policy. The claimant wants the agency to
initiate action, and the agency has done nothing.158
In other cases, however, the beneficiary's claim is for review of
action the agency has already taken. In seeking to overturn partic-
ular regulations as abuses of discretion, the plaintiff is not seeking
to initiate agency action, but to revise it. 159 What is central to ei-
ther assertion of right, however, is that the requested remedy is
some form of affirmative relief against the agency-to initiate en-
forcement, to reconsider a policy, to conduct rule making, and so
on.
As it happens, the affirmative remedies courts direct against
administrative agencies are typically modest. The standard of re-
view applied in "right of initiation" suits is usually deferential,160
and, even if the claimant succeeds, the resulting decree intrudes
little on agency discretion. For example, a judicial determination
that an agency has relied on a statutorily impermissible decision-
M Stewart and Sunstein, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1205-06 (cited in note 153).
"' See, for example, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (upholding reviewabil-
ity of agency failure to challenge union election allegedly in violation of the Labor Manage-
ment and Reporting Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 400-531). As Dunlop illustrates, the distinction
between agency inaction and inadequate agency action cannot be pressed very far. A non-
prosecution decision, after all, is not only a failure to prosecute, it is the affirmative adop-
tion of a policy that other possible agency functions take priority.
' ' See, for example, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
16o Stewart and Sunstein, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1205 (cited in note 153).
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making criterion results only in a remand for the decision to be
made under permissible criteria.161 A judicial determination that
an agency has improperly delayed the implementation of a policy
may result ultimately only in judicial approval of an agency-pro-
posed timetable for statutory compliance, or a judicial command to
commence policy formulation by a particular date.162
Yet, the supervisory nature of affirmative administrative reme-
dies reveals a kinship between the current wave of administrative
law and the more general phenomenon of "new" public law litiga-
tion in which judges are called upon to restructure public institu-
tions to conform with broad constitutional or statutory norms.
Such lawsuits, often involving schools, prisons, or mental hospitals,
may have a sprawling and amorphous party structure, focus largely
on "legislative"-type facts concerning institutional policy and its
effects, involve intense negotiations and prolonged judicial involve-
ment in the remedial stages, and require a more active and mana-
gerial role for the judge than is associated with many bipolar law-
suits involving traditionally conceived private rights.1 63 Challenges
to this mode of litigation frequently assert a confrontation between
the expansive judicial role involved and separation of powers prin-
ciples-the same confrontation of which the Guidelines' preamble
warns.
The Attorney General's Guidelines' expressed hostility to this
"reformation of administrative law" is consistent with the view the
Administration has endorsed in other contexts that the only
proper federal judicial role is awarding to particular aggrieved indi-
viduals, against particular individual wrongdoers, relief that is tai-
lored precisely to the vindication of traditionally conceived private
rights. 1 6 If this is the Administration's constitutional view, it is
unpersuasive. It rests on a model of the separation of powers that
the Constitution does not dictate, and it overstates the distinction
between modern public law litigation and traditional judicial
activity.
The hermetical separation that the Administration seems to
posit between policy making, whether legislative or administrative,
and judicial activity is not embodied in the Constitution. Strictly
101 See, for example, D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
12 See, for example, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150,
1157-58 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"' See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976).
'" See note 136.
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speaking, it is misleading to speak of a general separation of pow-
ers as a constitutional commandment, because the principle of sep-
aration-frequently contested as to its content-is only a back-
ground understanding to the document. What the Constitution
does command is an allocation of powers that seeks to foster a
checking and balancing of the co-equal branches to protect us from
the undue aggrandizement of federal power.""5 The predominance
of the checks and balances principle over the pure separation prin-
ciple is amply demonstrated by the vesting in each branch of pow-
ers that functionally overlap with the powers assigned to the other
branches.' The Administration has not made any persuasive ar-
gument that modern rights of initiation in administrative law un-
dermine the constitutional checks and balances.
Indeed, it would be hard to do so because recent administra-
tive law decisions make clear that federal courts believe that rights
of initiation are appropriate precisely because they help to protect
the system of checks and balances. That is, the recognition of such
rights is a judicial check to insure that the executive goes no fur-
ther in the implementation of Congressionally delegated power
than Congress intended. As one author has written, the animating
principle of administrative law that seems most clearly to- emerge
from recent cases is a variant of the "traditional . . . tenet that
agency action is justifiable only if it remains faithful to the dictates
of the legislative process.' 67 The difference in the recent cases is
that the courts have realized, as Professor Sunstein puts it, that
"statutes may be undermined through inaction and deregulation as
well as through overzealous enforcement."' Rights of initiation
"' See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984).
10' Congress's executive-type powers include the power of impeachment, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 2, par. 5, and the Senate's authority to advise and consent on treaties and adminis-
trative appointments, art. II, § 2, par. 2. The Senate conducts trials following impeachment,
art. I, § 3, par. 6, seemingly exercising a judicial power. The President's most obvious legis-
lative-type power is his power to veto legislation he disapproves, art. I, § 7, pars. 2 and 3. He
also possesses the judicial-type pardon power, art. II, § 2, par. 1. The Constitution does not
specify the powers of the judiciary, except for the decision of cases. Yet, it is commonly
perceived that the "judicial power" vested by article III encompasses some power to make
common law, a legislative-type power, and the executive-type power to charge with
contempt.
'"1 Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 586
(1985).
108 Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
Va. L. Rev. 271, 278 (1986).
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should, therefore, be understood as checks on usurpatious execu-
tive policy making implemented through "inaction.' 169
Modern implementation of this principle of fidelity to Con-
gress does depart from some traditional views of administrative
law in that (a) it both accepts and tries to legitimate the exercise
of broad administrative discretion, (b) it accepts the politiciza-
tion-to some degree-of agency decision making, and (c) it subor-
dinates traditional values of private autonomy to the value of fidel-
ity to congressional policy.170 Nonetheless, its animating impulse is
not to supplant legislative policy making, but to reinforce it-to
insure that the executive does not behave as if the Constitution,
rather than Congress, is its chief source of administrative discre-
tion in domestic policy making.
Just as the reformed model of administrative law is consistent
with traditional constitutional principles, so are the forms of action
evident in these cases and the limited role judges play in ordering
mandatory relief consistent with traditional understandings of ju-
dicial power. It is not new for judges to implement mandatory re-
lief to insure that inaction or resistance does not undermine the
rule of law; nor is it new for judges to engage in the supervision of
complex institutions.' 7' As Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell have
documented, courts sometimes have engaged in these supervisory
tasks without statutory imprimatur. 7 2 The fact that suits involv-
ing public institutions so often have seemed "new" is not because
of any historical discontinuity between the judicial role in these
suits and in other, more traditional litigative contexts, but because
the beneficiaries of such suits are more numerous and the substan-
tive rights they enforce are of recent creation. 17 3 There is simply no
persuasive evidence that federal judges in "right of initiation" suits
are threatening to overstep the bounds of the "judicial power"
vested in the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution.
This does not prove, however, that all exercises of judicial
power permissible under Article III are equally appropriate as a
matter of policy. The Administration could seek, for a variety of
policy reasons, to curtail judicial supervision of administrative
Judgments that constrain the executive to follow Congressional enactments perfect
rather than impede our democratic system. Such decrees should be added to Professor Mc-
Connell's catalogue of traditional means for giving "governmental policy... the force and
effect of law." McConnell, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 296 (cited in note 74).
170 Garland, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 586-90 (cited in note 167).
7 See generally Theodore Eisenberg and Stephan C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1980).
12 Id. at 488-91.
173 Id. at 516.
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agencies-but its appeal would have to be largely to Congress. It is
Congress's substantive and procedural commands that most effec-
tively determine the scope of judicial activity in administrative
law.174
For example, the Administration could seek to reduce judicial
activity in some areas because the Administration is unsympa-
thetic with the policy goals embodied in particular regulatory stat-
utes that the courts are enforcing. Its most straightforward course
would be to seek repeal of those statutes.17 5
More modestly, the Administration could ask Congress to re-
place command-and-control or "action-forcing" statutes with stat-
utes that pursue their goals through less centralized, more "recon-
stitutive" strategies aimed, for example, at altering market
behavior.176 The impetus for such proposals would likely be only
secondarily the desire to minimize the judicialization of adminis-
tration, and primarily the conviction that such strategies could ac-
complish socially useful ends more efficiently. Nonetheless, such
statutory changes would likely reduce the extent of judicial in-
volvement in administration.
Perhaps most modestly, the Administration-without chal-
lenging either current statutory substance or strategy-might seek
to persuade Congress to grant judicially unreviewable discretion to
agencies in the implementation of administrative statutes,
whatever general strategies Congress directs the agencies to em-
ploy. The Administration might argue that statutory reduction in
the authorized role for judicial review would promote greater polit-
ical responsiveness in the implementation of administrative stat-
utes because judicial supervision of implementation decisions can-
not help but affect their substantive content as well.177 Therefore,
administrative statutes should be rewritten in a way that permits
174 This is not to say, of course, that the courts-most notably, the Supreme Court-do
not have a major role to play. Because, for example, the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides so little guidance on informal administrative procedure, it is arguable that the courts
and not Congress have gone farthest in establishing the law of informal rule making and
adjudication. See, for example, Citizens for Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(creating judicial review on an "administrative record" of wholly informal decisions). It will
be interesting in this regard to view the performance of the Supreme Court's newest Justice,
Antonin Scalia, who is an eminent administrative law scholar. Nonetheless, it remains true
that any wholesale effort to redirect the system of American regulatory law will have to
emanate from the legislature empowered to provide for our system of public regulation.
178 The President has recently reactivated his Task Force on Regulatory Relief to pur-
sue this possibility.
M See generally Stewart, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 655 (cited in note 118); Richard B. Stew-
art, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 323 (1987).
177 See Stewart and Sunstein, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1199 (cited in note 153).
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the executive maximum leeway to implement those statutes in a
manner consistent with the policy implications of the most recent
presidential election.1 8
I believe that a philosophy of maximizing future presidential
discretion in the implementation of administrative statutes is, in
fact, a key part of the philosophy that animates the Attorney Gen-
eral's Guidelines.1 79 This goal is to be achieved even at the cost of
reducing current discretion to settle lawsuits. 180 As Professor Mc-
Connell's reply to this article attests, moreover, to articulate the
maximization of discretion as a mere policy goal is to understate
the importance the Administration attaches to it. As interpreted
by Professor McConnell and, I believe, by the current Administra-
tion, the President's broad discretion to shape regulatory policy is
a constitutional mandate implicit in our democratic system of
government.18 '
178 Congress's institutional interests do not necessarily militate in favor of any such
proposal, however; nor do the political interests of conservative Republicans. Unreviewable
discretion in James Watt's hands one day will become unreviewable discretion in Cecil An-
drus's another. The fantasy that the people's choice of an ideologically committed President
repudiates all the policies of his predecessor that are contrary to that ideology is one that no
Reaganite would utter should Democrats recapture the White House in 1988. It is not a
sound model on which to build administrative law.
179 It is worth underscoring that the Administration's policy is to maximize presiden-
tial, not subordinate agency, discretion. This is evident from its innovations in the centrali-
zation of executive regulatory oversight in the Office of Management and Budget, see Shane,
Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 12,191, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1235, 1245 (1981); Note, Presidential Policy
Management of Agency Rules Under Reagan Order 12,498, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 63 (1986); and
from the Administration's expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of independent regu-
latory agencies. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Question of Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1986 p. B8, col. 3 (commenting on Sept. 13, 1985 address of Attorney General
Meese to Federal Bar Association).
180 McConnell, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 305-08 (cited in note 74). As Professor Jost
observes, however, the Guidelines do not absolutely preclude decrees that bind later admin-
istrations because the Attorney General retains plenary authority to approve any decree.
Jost, 39 Admin. L. Rev. at 104-05 (cited in note 143).
181 McConnell, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 300-01, 318-21. With respect, I dissent strongly
from Professor McConnell's view of the presidency, which lies at the core of our disagree-
ment generally. Contrary to his assertions, it says little about the issues at hand that presi-
dents are limited to four-year terms. Presidents do, notwithstanding their limited terms,
exert some effective control over the discretion of their successors. (Most obviously, a presi-
dent binds his successors to treat as law any Congressional enactments that the President
signs into law, and disables his successors from treating as law any bills he vetoes that Con-
gress does not enact by two-thirds vote.) The question is not whether presidents may ever
limit their successors' discretion, but the extent to which they may do so.
Nor does it prove anything that Congress could not, as Professor McConnell argues
(and I agree), permit one president to constrain his successors' constitutionally based dis-
cretion beyond the degree to which the Constitution gives a president such authority. The
issue Professor McConnell short changes is whether Congress may permit presidents to con-
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Professor McConnell and the Administration,' however, virtu-
ally ignore that it is Congress, not the executive, that has primary
authority for making domestic regulatory policy. The President's
policy-making discretion in the such areas as the regulation of the
environment, protecting occupational health and safety, and bank-
ing regulation-to name a very few of the hundreds of areas of
domestic regulation-derives from statutory delegations. On the
last day of the Reagan Administration, if Congress were to pass
and President Reagan to sign an act incorporating as law all ad-
ministrative regulations promulgated between 1981 and 1988, there
would be no diminution in the constitutional authority of the next
President-even if he were a Democrat and even if he disagreed
vehemently with all such regulations. The reason we can plausibly
claim to have a politically accountable government with respect to
domestic regulatory policy is not, for the most part, because we
vote for the President, but rather because we vote for Congress.
This article has argued for a reading of Congress's current rel-
evant enactments that authorizes a limited role for the executive
branch in constraining future administrative discretion in the con-
text of settling litigation. If Congress does have primary authority
for domestic regulatory policy, and if my statutory reading is right,
then it is not a persuasive objection that the executive's exercise of
its statutory discretion-limiting power undercuts any principle of
electoral accountability implicit in the Constitution. It may make
it more difficult to change regulatory policy simply by replacing
the President; whether that is a good or a bad thing is not obvious
and may well depend on the nature of the regulatory program at
issue. In any event, however, Congress retains the power to vest
such settlement discretion in the executive. So long as citizens may
petition Congress to withdraw such authority or campaign against
members of Congress who refuse to do so, all electoral accountabil-
ity guaranteed by the Constitution remains intact.
Of course, even though Congress is free to respond to the full
variety of possible executive recommendations for regulatory re-
form, it is no surprise that someone such as the Attorney General,
who disfavors judicial supervision in "right of initiation" adminis-
strain future administrators in the exercise of their statutorily based discretion. It is not a
persuasive answer to argue that Congress, in so doing, would be authorizing intrusions into
later presidents' power "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." If the laws
Congress passes enable one president to curtail the enforcement discretion of later adminis-
trations, and a president invokes such authority, then later administrations, implementing
their curtailed discretion, are faithfully executing the laws, as Congress has enacted them;
no constitutional power has been lost.
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trative lawsuits, will be alarmed by the phenomenon of consent de-
crees in such lawsuits. Such consent decrees, because of their vol-
untary character, would seem forcefully to help legitimate a vision
of administrative law and of the courts' proper place in adminis-
tration that is antithetical to a model of largely unconstrained ex-
ecutive discretion over the implementation of law. To issue the
Guidelines in this cause, however, is, in the current legal environ-
ment, but to take "arms against a sea of troubles." They cannot
make the source of grievance-the modern regulatory state-go
away.
CONCLUSION
Consent decrees that turn ordinarily revisable administrative
discretion into substantially nonrevisable administrative discretion
are a significant development in administrative law. Constitutional
and statutory limits exist as to the kinds of promises the executive
may make in a decree, although potential problems are avoidable
through careful drafting. Courts may approve any promises that
the executive is empowered to make, although separation of pow-
ers principles counsel sensitivity in the interpretation, modifica-
tion, and enforcement of discretion-limiting decrees.
Discretion-limiting consent decrees, like all other forms of set-
tlement or judgment, have the potential for affecting the interests
of third parties unrepresented in their formulation. These interests
could be additionally protected, and at little cost, if notices of pro-
posed settlements, at least in certain classes of important cases,
were published in the Federal Register and if agencies were re-
quired to provide statements defending proposed consent decrees
as rational means of implementing their responsibilities and pro-
tecting the interests of the United States in litigation. Addition-
ally, it might prove appropriate on further study to require agen-
cies to help to assure representation in the settlement process for
interests shared by an otherwise unorganized constituency. These
reforms, together with currently existing protections for third par-
ties, should mitigate the risk to third-party rights from lack of rep-
resentation, lack of adversariness, or inattention to principle in the
consent decree process.
Discretion-limiting consent decrees are important also because
their existence makes a statement about our prevailing conception
of public law and its purposes. Such decrees represent executive
acquiescence in a form of litigation that departs from a model of
judicial activity based solely on bipolar disputes over traditional
private rights. For this reason, the Reagan Administration has
[1987:
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launched an attack on discretion-limiting decrees. I do not share
the Administration's perception that such decrees are part of an
overjudicialization of administrative policy making. Nor do I share
Professor Fiss's distinct concern that consent decrees contribute
unduly to the privatization of our genuinely public law. The evolu-
tion of judicial law to embrace new beneficiary remedies for a
broader range of substantive rights, and judicial willingness to
enter consent decress implementing those rights, seem natural arti-
facts of the courts' faithfulness to Congress's increased concern
since the late 1960s with the quality of our economic and social
life.

